Strive to be first or avoid being last: an experiment on relative performance incentives
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Cites work
- A model of reference-dependent preferences
- Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests
- Individual-level loss aversion in riskless and risky choices
- Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
- Performance in Competitive Environments: Gender Differences
- Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
- Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions
- Reinforcement and directional learning in the ultimatum game with responder competition
- Relative performance compensation, contests, and dynamic incentives
- Strategy and dynamics in contests
- The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I
- The nature of tournaments
Cited in
(12)- First vs. best improvement: an empirical study
- Framing of incentives and effort provision
- Shirking and ``choking under incentive-based pressure: A behavioral economic theory of performance production
- Social motives and risk-taking in investment decisions
- Relative performance compensation, contests, and dynamic incentives
- How tournament incentives affect asset markets: a comparison between winner-take-all tournaments and elimination contests
- Turning relative deprivation into a performance incentive device
- ``Success breeds success or ``Pride goes before a fall? Teams and individuals in multi-contest tournaments
- Tournament rewards and heavy tails
- Contests with group size uncertainty: experimental evidence
- Study of psychological preferences in working contest
- First-mover advantage in best-of series: an experimental comparison of role-assignment rules
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