Strive to be first or avoid being last: an experiment on relative performance incentives

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.08.008zbMATH Open1347.91104OpenAlexW1955371898MaRDI QIDQ894607FDOQ894607

Florian Lindner, Loukas Balafoutas, Matthias Sutter, Dmitry Ryvkin, E. Glenn Dutcher

Publication date: 2 December 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/120981

Recommendations

• Relative performance compensation, contests, and dynamic incentives
• Incentive effects and overcrowding in tournaments: An experimental analysis
• Framing of incentives and effort provision
• When higher prizes lead to lower efforts -- the impact of favoritism in tournaments
• Designing Multiperson Tournaments with Asymmetric Contestants: An Experimental Study

zbMATH Keywords

experimentlearningtournamentcontractloserwinner

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• Relative Performance Compensation, Contests, and Dynamic Incentives
• The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences*
• The nature of tournaments
• Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions
• Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests
• Reinforcement and directional learning in the ultimatum game with responder competition
• Performance in Competitive Environments: Gender Differences
• Individual-level loss aversion in riskless and risky choices

Cited In (7)

• First vs. best improvement: an empirical study
• Shirking and ``choking under incentive-based pressure: A behavioral economic theory of performance production
• Social motives and risk-taking in investment decisions
• How tournament incentives affect asset markets: a comparison between winner-take-all tournaments and elimination contests
• Tournament rewards and heavy tails
• Contests with group size uncertainty: experimental evidence
• First-mover advantage in best-of series: an experimental comparison of role-assignment rules

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

This page was built for publication: Strive to be first or avoid being last: an experiment on relative performance incentives

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q894607)