Shirking and ``choking under incentive-based pressure: A behavioral economic theory of performance production

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2012.03.030MaRDI QIDQ694902zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bhavneet Walia, Shane Sanders

Publication date 19 December 2012

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.03.030

zbMATH Keywords

choking under pressureperformance incentivesshirking under pressure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Cites work

• Large Stakes and Big Mistakes

Cited in

(3)

• Home advantage and mispricing in indoor sports' ghost games: the case of European basketball
• Always doing your best? Effort and performance in dynamic settings
• Large Stakes and Big Mistakes

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