Shirking and ``choking under incentive-based pressure: A behavioral economic theory of performance production

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2012.03.030zbMATH Open1253.91102OpenAlexW2046044250MaRDI QIDQ694902FDOQ694902

Bhavneet Walia, Shane Sanders

Publication date: 19 December 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.03.030

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zbMATH Keywords

choking under pressureperformance incentivesshirking under pressure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• Large Stakes and Big Mistakes

Cited In (2)

• Home advantage and mispricing in indoor sports' ghost games: the case of European basketball
• Always doing your best? Effort and performance in dynamic settings

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