Incentives and performance in the presence of wealth effects and endogenous risk
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Publication:2496785
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Cites work
- Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
- An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
- Capital market equilibrium with moral hazard
- Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmstrom-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision
- Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
- The first-order approach to the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility
- The pricing of options and corporate liabilities
Cited in
(9)- Risk-incentives trade-off and outside options
- Goal setting in the principal-agent model: weak incentives for strong performance
- Moral hazard in innovation: the relationship between risk aversion and performance pay
- Shirking and ``choking under incentive-based pressure: A behavioral economic theory of performance production
- Optimal incentives in a principal-agent model with endogenous technology
- On managerial risk-taking incentives when compensation may be hedged against
- Correlation neglect, incentives, and welfare
- The risk and incentives trade-off in the presence of heterogeneous managers
- Wealth effects and agency costs
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