Incentives and performance in the presence of wealth effects and endogenous risk
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Publication:2496785
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2004.07.010zbMATH Open1132.91521OpenAlexW1996977451MaRDI QIDQ2496785FDOQ2496785
Authors: Ming Guo, Hui Ou-Yang 
Publication date: 20 July 2006
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.07.010
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Cites Work
- The pricing of options and corporate liabilities
- An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
- Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
- Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
- The first-order approach to the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility
- Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmstrom-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision
- Capital market equilibrium with moral hazard
Cited In (9)
- Risk-incentives trade-off and outside options
- Goal setting in the principal-agent model: weak incentives for strong performance
- Moral hazard in innovation: the relationship between risk aversion and performance pay
- Shirking and ``choking under incentive-based pressure: A behavioral economic theory of performance production
- Optimal incentives in a principal-agent model with endogenous technology
- On managerial risk-taking incentives when compensation may be hedged against
- Correlation neglect, incentives, and welfare
- The risk and incentives trade-off in the presence of heterogeneous managers
- Wealth effects and agency costs
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