An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem

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Moral hazard and limited liability: The real effects of contract bargaining
PENALTIES WITHIN THE MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM
On the first-order approach in principal-agent models with hidden borrowing and lending
Overconfidence and moral hazard
Tournaments as a response to ambiguity aversion in incentive contracts
An envelope approach to tournament design
Optimal incentives and the time dimension of performance measurement
Subjective evaluation versus public information
Incentive contracts when production is subcontracted
Time consistent taxation by a government with redistributive goals
Risk-bearing and entrepreneurship
Optimal contracting of separable production technologies
Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all?
Optimal retention in agency problems
Renegotiating moral hazard contracts under limited liability and monotonicity
Greater prudence and greater downside risk aversion
Optimal portfolio delegation when parties have different coefficients of risk aversion
Solution concepts of principal-agent models with unawareness of actions
Computing solutions to moral-hazard programs using the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition algorithm
Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability
The optimality of team contracts
A note on the strategic transmission of endogenous information
Mechanism design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in distributed information systems
Incentives and performance in the presence of wealth effects and endogenous risk
Managerial reporting discretion and the truthfulness of disclosures
Information in tournaments under limited liability
Contracting theory with competitive interacting agents
Information, risk sharing, and incentives in agency problems
Agency conflicts in the presence of random private benefits from project implementation
The principal/agent paradigm: Its relevance to various functional fields
On the value of randomization
Economic juries and public project provision
The value of information: The case of signal-dependent opportunity sets
On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach
Moral hazard with excess returns
Dynamic incentive contracts with termination threats
Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort
Common shocks and relative compensation
Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard
Agency theory: choice-based foundations of the parametrized distribution formulation
Value of communication in agencies
Competitive equilibrium with moral hazard in economies with multiple commodities.
Moral hazard and subjective evaluation
Outsourcing of innovation
Wealth effects in the principal agent model
Experimental perspectives on incentives in organisations
Markets and contracts
Regulation of a risk averse firm
Information space conditions for the first-order approach in agency problems
Moral hazard with bounded payments
Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
Asymmetric awareness and moral hazard
Linear contracts and the double moral-hazard
Vertical wage differences in hierarchically structured firms
Allocation of resources in a divisionalized firm
On the optimal taxation of capital income
Informed principal, moral hazard, and the value of a more informative technology
The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont
The value of information in a principal-agent model with moral hazard: the ex post contracting case
A general Lagrangian approach for non-concave moral hazard problems
Effects of changes in preferences in moral hazard problems
The moral hazard problem with high stakes
Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach
Incentive contracting under ambiguity aversion
Ad valorem versus per unit taxation: a perspective from price signaling
The existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model
Existence and monotonicity of solutions to moral hazard problems
A new class of sufficient conditions for the first-order approach to the principal-agent problem
Design of incentive programs for optimal medication adherence in the presence of observable consumption
Contracts with endogenous information
On the effects of the degree of discretion in reporting managerial performance
Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
An uncertain wage contract model for risk-averse worker under bilateral moral hazard
Limited liability and the risk-incentive relationship
Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard
Intertemporal incentives under loss aversion
Characterizing optimal wages in principal-agent problems without using the first-order approach
Derivative evaluation and computational experience with large bilevel mathematical programs
Optimal contract mechanisms for principal-agent problems with moral hazard and adverse selection
The existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems
Generic property of the partial calmness condition for bilevel programming problems
Simple contracts under observable and hidden actions
Learning approximately optimal contracts
Normative properties of stock market equilibrium with moral hazard
Optimal technology design
Screening teams of moral and altruistic agents
Response time and vendor-assembler relationship in a supply chain
Salience bias and overwork
Delegated online search
Operating efficiency and output insensitive employment contracts for capital management
Classical statistics as a theory of incentives
TAKING EFFORT SERIOUSLY: A REPLY TO CURRIE AND STEEDMAN
Wealth effects and agency costs
Optimal multilevel organization modelling for active contributions of principals
Quantum contracts between Schrödinger and a cat
Stochastic programming perspective on the agency problems under uncertainty
Incentive and quality assurance: an agency theoretical perspective
On incentives, temptation and self-control
Monotone second-best optimal contracts

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