Cited in
(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Outsourcing of innovation
- Contracts with endogenous information
- Optimal multilevel organization modelling for active contributions of principals
- The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont
- Timing of information in agency problems with hidden actions
- Contracts without memory in multiperiod agency models
- Efficient outcomes in a repeated agency model without discounting
- The existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model
- Incentive contracts when production is subcontracted
- Value of communication in agencies
- Derivative evaluation and computational experience with large bilevel mathematical programs
- Job challenge as a motivator in a principal-agent setting
- Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
- Posterior-preserving information improvements and principal-agent relationships
- Classical statistics as a theory of incentives
- Lineare versus sprungfixe Erfolgsbeteiligung. (Linear versus piecewise constant reward schemes)
- Managerial reporting discretion and the truthfulness of disclosures
- Monotone second-best optimal contracts
- Games with partially enforceable agreements
- Regulation of a risk averse firm
- Moral hazard and limited liability: The real effects of contract bargaining
- Optimal retention in agency problems
- Linear contracts and the double moral-hazard
- Minimax adjustment technique and fuzzy information
- The principal/agent paradigm: Its relevance to various functional fields
- Preference representation and randomization in principal-agent contracts
- Decision-making by an authority under influence
- The principal-agent problem when the agent has access to outside markets
- A solution to a class of agency problems, with application to the question of limited liability
- Limited liability and the underlying-asset constraint: On the use of share-derivative contracts to resolve agency problems
- Optimal contract mechanisms for principal-agent problems with moral hazard and adverse selection
- On the optimal taxation of capital income
- Time consistent taxation by a government with redistributive goals
- Allocation of resources in a divisionalized firm
- Incentive roles and fringe benefits in compensation contracts
- Incentive contracts in two-sided moral hazards with multiple agents
- Implementing coordinated team play
- Optimal contracting of separable production technologies
- The value of information: The case of signal-dependent opportunity sets
- A multi-criteria agency model with incomplete preference information.
- Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort
- Intertemporal incentives under loss aversion
- State subsidy and moral hazard in corporate financing
- Welfare effects of payment truncation in piece rate tournaments
- A modified homotopy method for solving the principal-agent bilevel programming problem
- A principal-agent problem with heterogeneous demand distributions for a carbon capture and storage system
- The informativeness principle without the first-order approach
- Communicating subjective evaluations
- Analysis of various optimal contracts in the problem of stimulation of agents by a principal in a model with two agents
- Subjective expected utility theory with costly actions
- Moral hazard with non-additive uncertainty: when are actions implementable?
- Incentive mechanism design aiming at deflated performance manipulation in retail firms: based on the ratchet effect and the reputation effect
- Operating efficiency and output insensitive employment contracts for capital management
- Incentive compatible strategies for general Stackelberg games with incomplete information
- Competitive equilibrium with moral hazard in economies with multiple commodities.
- Capital market equilibrium with moral hazard
- Incentive contracts and strictly proper scoring rules.
- Random sampling within the framework of a multivariate principal-agent approach
- Linear incentive schemes and Poisson processes in economic agency models
- Greater prudence and greater downside risk aversion
- Wealth effects in the principal agent model
- Matching with peer monitoring
- Simple contracts under observable and hidden actions
- Wealth effects and agency costs
- Ad valorem versus per unit taxation: a perspective from price signaling
- Globally convergent method for designing twice spline contractual function
- Effects of changes in preferences in moral hazard problems
- Optimal incentives under gift exchange
- Bayesian agency: linear versus tractable contracts
- The principal-agent model in venture investment based on fairness preference
- The moral hazard problem with high stakes
- Optimal incentives for teams: a multiscale decision theory approach
- Executive compensation and competitive pressure in the product market: how does firm entry shape managerial incentives?
- Rational inattention and the monotone likelihood ratio property
- Committing to correlated strategies with multiple leaders
- Bank monitoring incentives under moral hazard and adverse selection
- The principal-agent problem with smooth ambiguity
- Incentive contracting under ambiguity aversion
- On incentives, temptation and self-control
- Solution concepts of principal-agent models with unawareness of actions
- The optimality of team contracts
- Response time and vendor-assembler relationship in a supply chain
- An uncertain wage contract model for risk-averse worker under bilateral moral hazard
- On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach
- Asymmetric awareness and moral hazard
- Globally convergent homotopy method for designing piecewise linear deterministic contractual function
- The role of boundary solutions in principal-agent problems of the Holmström-Milgrom type
- Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard
- Risk-bearing and entrepreneurship
- Vertical wage differences in hierarchically structured firms
- Incentives and performance in the presence of wealth effects and endogenous risk
- Existence and monotonicity of solutions to moral hazard problems
- Premium allocation and risk avoidance in a large firm: A continuous model
- On the value of information in the presence of moral hazard
- Screening teams of moral and altruistic agents
- Salience bias and overwork
- Multi-market portfolio optimization with conditional value at risk
- Quantum contracts between Schrödinger and a cat
- An envelope approach to tournament design
- Delegation in vertical relationships: the role of reciprocity
This page was built for publication: An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3970124)
