An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem

Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)

Moral hazard with bounded payments
The value of information in a principal-agent model with moral hazard: the ex post contracting case
Agency conflicts in the presence of random private benefits from project implementation
On the value of randomization
Dynamic incentive contracts with termination threats
Informed principal, moral hazard, and the value of a more informative technology
Incentive contracting under ambiguity aversion
On the effects of the degree of discretion in reporting managerial performance
Incentives and performance in the presence of wealth effects and endogenous risk
Design of Incentive Programs for Optimal Medication Adherence in the Presence of Observable Consumption
Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard
Wealth effects in the principal agent model
Optimal portfolio delegation when parties have different coefficients of risk aversion
An uncertain wage contract model for risk-averse worker under bilateral moral hazard
An envelope approach to tournament design
Subjective evaluation versus public information
Optimal incentives and the time dimension of performance measurement
Asymmetric awareness and moral hazard
Risk-bearing and entrepreneurship
Mechanism design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in distributed information systems
Managerial reporting discretion and the truthfulness of disclosures
Ad valorem versus per unit taxation: a perspective from price signaling
Greater prudence and greater downside risk aversion
Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
Linear contracts and the double moral-hazard
A general Lagrangian approach for non-concave moral hazard problems
Computing solutions to moral-hazard programs using the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition algorithm
Regulation of a risk averse firm
Information space conditions for the first-order approach in agency problems
The moral hazard problem with high stakes
Optimal retention in agency problems
Information in tournaments under limited liability
The existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model
PENALTIES WITHIN THE MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM
Incentive contracts when production is subcontracted
Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort
Allocation of resources in a divisionalized firm
Moral hazard and limited liability: The real effects of contract bargaining
Solution concepts of principal-agent models with unawareness of actions
Economic juries and public project provision
Vertical wage differences in hierarchically structured firms
Contracts with endogenous information
Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
Experimental perspectives on incentives in organisations
Tournaments as a response to ambiguity aversion in incentive contracts
Outsourcing of innovation
Markets and contracts
Time consistent taxation by a government with redistributive goals
Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability
A note on the strategic transmission of endogenous information
Moral hazard and subjective evaluation
Competitive equilibrium with moral hazard in economies with multiple commodities.
The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont
Derivative evaluation and computational experience with large bilevel mathematical programs
On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach
On the first-order approach in principal-agent models with hidden borrowing and lending
INFORMATION, RISK SHARING, AND INCENTIVES IN AGENCY PROBLEMS
On the optimal taxation of capital income
Limited liability and the risk-incentive relationship
Renegotiating moral hazard contracts under limited liability and monotonicity
Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all?
The principal/agent paradigm: Its relevance to various functional fields
A new class of sufficient conditions for the first-order approach to the principal-agent problem
Overconfidence and moral hazard
The value of information: The case of signal-dependent opportunity sets
Moral hazard with excess returns
Value of communication in agencies
Optimal contracting of separable production technologies
Effects of changes in preferences in moral hazard problems
Agency theory: choice-based foundations of the parametrized distribution formulation
The optimality of team contracts
Common shocks and relative compensation
Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard
Characterizing optimal wages in principal-agent problems without using the first-order approach
Contracting Theory with Competitive Interacting Agents
Existence and monotonicity of solutions to moral hazard problems
Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach
Intertemporal incentives under loss aversion
Principal-Agent Models
TAKING EFFORT SERIOUSLY: A REPLY TO CURRIE AND STEEDMAN
Wealth effects and agency costs
Bayesian agency: linear versus tractable contracts
Labor market efficiency: output as the measure of welfare
Executive compensation and competitive pressure in the product market: how does firm entry shape managerial incentives?
The role of boundary solutions in principal-agent problems of the Holmström-Milgrom type
Designing menus of contracts efficiently: the power of randomization
Optimal incentives under gift exchange
Efficient outcomes in a repeated agency model without discounting
Bank monitoring incentives under moral hazard and adverse selection
The ratchet effect: a learning perspective
Matching with peer monitoring
The straight and narrow: a game theory model of broad- and narrow-spectrum empiric antibiotic therapy
Delegated information acquisition with moral hazard
A dual approach to agency problems
Robust incentives for risk
A DEA methodology to evaluate the impact of information asymmetry on the efficiency of not-for-profit organizations with an application to higher education in Brazil
Optimal incentives for teams: a multiscale decision theory approach
Simple contracts under observable and hidden actions
Incentive contracts and strictly proper scoring rules.

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