An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem

DOI10.2307/1912246zbMath0503.90018OpenAlexW3124071598WikidataQ56213601 ScholiaQ56213601MaRDI QIDQ3970124

Publication date: 1983

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4391749000000000339.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazard risk sharing principal-agent problem uncertain environment market allocations under uncertainty optimal incentive scheme

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Convex programming (90C25) Applications of mathematical programming (90C90) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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