An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem

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Intertemporal incentives under loss aversion
Moral hazard with bounded payments
The value of information in a principal-agent model with moral hazard: the ex post contracting case
Efficient outcomes in a repeated agency model without discounting
Optimal incentives under gift exchange
Agency conflicts in the presence of random private benefits from project implementation
On the value of randomization
Designing menus of contracts efficiently: the power of randomization
Dynamic incentive contracts with termination threats
Bank monitoring incentives under moral hazard and adverse selection
On the effects of the degree of discretion in reporting managerial performance
Incentive contracting under ambiguity aversion
Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard
Matching with peer monitoring
Informed principal, moral hazard, and the value of a more informative technology
The ratchet effect: a learning perspective
Incentives and performance in the presence of wealth effects and endogenous risk
Wealth effects in the principal agent model
A DEA methodology to evaluate the impact of information asymmetry on the efficiency of not-for-profit organizations with an application to higher education in Brazil
The complexity of contracts
Optimal portfolio delegation when parties have different coefficients of risk aversion
Delegated information acquisition with moral hazard
The straight and narrow: a game theory model of broad- and narrow-spectrum empiric antibiotic therapy
An envelope approach to tournament design
Subjective evaluation versus public information
Optimal incentives for teams: a multiscale decision theory approach
Simple contracts under observable and hidden actions
An uncertain wage contract model for risk-averse worker under bilateral moral hazard
A dual approach to agency problems
Robust incentives for risk
Incentive contracts and strictly proper scoring rules.
Incentive contracts in two-sided moral hazards with multiple agents
Optimal incentives and the time dimension of performance measurement
The role of government in the venture capital market with asymmetric information
Rational inattention and the monotone likelihood ratio property
Asymmetric awareness and moral hazard
Monotone second-best optimal contracts
Mechanism design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in distributed information systems
Managerial reporting discretion and the truthfulness of disclosures
The principal-agent problem with smooth ambiguity
Risk-bearing and entrepreneurship
Globally convergent homotopy method for designing piecewise linear deterministic contractual function
Multi-market portfolio optimization with conditional value at risk
Ad valorem versus per unit taxation: a perspective from price signaling
Greater prudence and greater downside risk aversion
Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
Linear contracts and the double moral-hazard
Technical change and the decentralization penalty
Premium allocation and risk avoidance in a large firm: A continuous model
Computing solutions to moral-hazard programs using the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition algorithm
Job challenge as a motivator in a principal-agent setting
Information space conditions for the first-order approach in agency problems
A general Lagrangian approach for non-concave moral hazard problems
Regulation of a risk averse firm
Committing to correlated strategies with multiple leaders
The moral hazard problem with high stakes
Delegated online search
Optimal retention in agency problems
Information in tournaments under limited liability
Principal-agent models
The existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model
Incentive contracts when production is subcontracted
Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort
PENALTIES WITHIN THE MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM
Overconfidence and ethical contracts
Communicating subjective evaluations
Analysis of various optimal contracts in the problem of stimulation of agents by a principal in a model with two agents
Incentive compatible strategies for general Stackelberg games with incomplete information
A general solution method for moral hazard problems
Globally convergent homotopy algorithm for solving the KKT systems to the principal-agent bilevel programming
Allocation of resources in a divisionalized firm
Linear incentive schemes and Poisson processes in economic agency models
State subsidy and moral hazard in corporate financing
Optimal multilevel organization modelling for active contributions of principals
On the value of information in the presence of moral hazard
Data-driven contract design
Statistical uncertainty and coarse contracts
Subjective expected utility theory with costly actions
Minimax adjustment technique and fuzzy information
Information, risk sharing, and incentives in agency problems
Optimal contract mechanisms for principal-agent problems with moral hazard and adverse selection
Moral hazard and limited liability: The real effects of contract bargaining
Economic juries and public project provision
Robust contracting under double moral hazard
Solution concepts of principal-agent models with unawareness of actions
Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
Games with partially enforceable agreements
Contracts with endogenous information
Vertical wage differences in hierarchically structured firms
Contracting theory with competitive interacting agents
Preference representation and randomization in principal-agent contracts
Welfare effects of payment truncation in piece rate tournaments
A modified homotopy method for solving the principal-agent bilevel programming problem
Incentive and quality assurance: an agency theoretical perspective
Principal-multiagents problem under equivalent changes of measure: general study and an existence result
Experimental perspectives on incentives in organisations
A multi-criteria agency model with incomplete preference information.
Design of incentive programs for optimal medication adherence in the presence of observable consumption
Random sampling within the framework of a multivariate principal-agent approach

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