Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices

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Publication:753644

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90066-SzbMath0716.90021MaRDI QIDQ753644

Robert D. Innes

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)




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