Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
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Publication:753644
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90066-SzbMath0716.90021MaRDI QIDQ753644
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (66)
Relational contracts and the first-order approach ⋮ Limited liability and the underlying-asset constraint: On the use of share-derivative contracts to resolve agency problems ⋮ Stress tests and information disclosure ⋮ Moral hazard, renegotiation and debt ⋮ Incentive contracting with hidden choices of effort and risk ⋮ The principal-agent model in venture investment based on fairness preference ⋮ Debt, moral hazard and airline safety: An empirical evidence ⋮ Welfare effects of payment truncation in piece rate tournaments ⋮ Salience bias and overwork ⋮ Design of Incentive Programs for Optimal Medication Adherence in the Presence of Observable Consumption ⋮ Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard ⋮ The existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems ⋮ An analytically solvable principal-agent model ⋮ Endogenous criteria for success ⋮ The loan contract with costly state verification and subjective beliefs ⋮ Quantum contracts between Schrödinger and a cat ⋮ Robust incentives for risk ⋮ Optimal technology design ⋮ Optimal incentive contracts with a spiteful principal: single agent ⋮ Robust contracting under double moral hazard ⋮ Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: a laboratory experiment ⋮ Relative income concerns, dismissal, and the use of pay-for-performance ⋮ Ex post participation constraint in a principal-agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard ⋮ Incentivizing research with (un)conditional teaching duties: punishment or rent extraction? ⋮ Minimum payments and induced effort in moral hazard problems ⋮ All-or-nothing payments ⋮ A general solution method for moral hazard problems ⋮ On the existence of share contracts under limited liability ⋮ The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability ⋮ A comparison of cardinal tournaments and piece rate contracts with liquidity constrained agents ⋮ Adverse selection in credit markets and regressive profit taxation ⋮ Public procurement in times of crisis: the bundling decision reconsidered ⋮ Securitizing and tranching longevity exposures ⋮ Robust Contract Designs: Linear Contracts and Moral Hazard ⋮ Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement ⋮ On the generalized principal-agent problem: a comment ⋮ Task scheduling and moral hazard ⋮ Security design with interim public information ⋮ Risk sharing, risk shifting and the role of convertible debt ⋮ Moral hazard with limited liability: random-variable formulation and optimal contract structures ⋮ Voluntary disclosure in bilateral transactions ⋮ Simple contracts under observable and hidden actions ⋮ Moral hazard with bounded payments ⋮ Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency ⋮ Security bid auctions for agency contracts ⋮ Renegotiating moral hazard contracts under limited liability and monotonicity ⋮ The debt hangover: Renegotiation with noncontractible investment ⋮ Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion ⋮ Incentive-compatibility, limited liability and costly liquidation in financial contracting ⋮ What can we learn from simulating a standard agency model? ⋮ Information in tournaments under limited liability ⋮ Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability ⋮ Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation ⋮ Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm ⋮ Operating efficiency and output insensitive employment contracts for capital management ⋮ The risk-sharing problem under limited liability constraints in a single-period model ⋮ Monotonicity of Optimal Contracts Without the First-Order Approach ⋮ Optimal contract under double moral hazard and limited liability ⋮ Moral hazard and limited liability: The real effects of contract bargaining ⋮ Optimal securities under adverse selection and moral hazard ⋮ GRANTING AN EXIT OPTION TO CONDUCT AN AUDIT ⋮ Motivating informed decisions ⋮ Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all? ⋮ Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership ⋮ Job design with sequential tasks and outcome externalities revisited ⋮ A multi-period game theoretic model of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs
Cites Work
- Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
- Incentive schemes with multiple agents and bankcruptcy constraints
- Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
- Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
- The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
- Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
- An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
- The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I
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