Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all?
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Recommendations
- Optimal contract mechanisms for principal-agent problems with moral hazard and adverse selection
- Linear contracts and the double moral-hazard
- The optimal contract under adverse selection in a moral-hazard model with a risk-averse agent
- Optimal contracts under competition when uncertainty from adverse selection and moral hazard are present
- Dynamic contracts with moral hazard and adverse selection
Cites work
- Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
- An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
- Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability
- Calibrated incentive contracts
- Countervailing incentives in agency problems
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
- Ex post participation constraint in a principal-agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard
- Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
- Noisy Observation in Adverse Selection Models
- Optimal contracting of separable production technologies
- Optimal contracting with private knowledge of wealth and ability
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
- Optimality and robustness of the English auction
- Renegotiating moral hazard contracts under limited liability and monotonicity
- Robust Mechanism Design
- Robust contracting with additive noise
- Strict monotonicity in comparative statics
- The English auction is optimal among simple sequential auctions
- The Wage Policy of a Firm
- Value of communication in agencies
Cited in
(11)- Endogenous selection and moral hazard in compensation contracts
- Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case
- Nonparametric identification of a contract model with adverse selection and moral hazard
- Optimal contracts under competition when uncertainty from adverse selection and moral hazard are present
- The optimal contract under adverse selection in a moral-hazard model with a risk-averse agent
- Optimal contracts for agents with adverse selection
- Simultaneous moral hazard and adverse selection with risk averse agents
- Simple contracts with double-sided moral hazard and adverse selection
- Multi-period contracts between principal and agent with adverse selection
- Dynamic contracts with moral hazard and adverse selection
- Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard
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