Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all?
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Publication:776858
DOI10.1007/S00182-019-00700-5zbMATH Open1444.91121OpenAlexW2213929344WikidataQ126526151 ScholiaQ126526151MaRDI QIDQ776858FDOQ776858
Authors: Felipe Balmaceda 
Publication date: 13 July 2020
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-019-00700-5
Recommendations
- Optimal contract mechanisms for principal-agent problems with moral hazard and adverse selection
- Linear contracts and the double moral-hazard
- The optimal contract under adverse selection in a moral-hazard model with a risk-averse agent
- Optimal contracts under competition when uncertainty from adverse selection and moral hazard are present
- Dynamic contracts with moral hazard and adverse selection
Cites Work
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
- An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
- Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
- Robust Mechanism Design
- Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
- Strict monotonicity in comparative statics
- The English auction is optimal among simple sequential auctions
- Optimality and robustness of the English auction
- Calibrated incentive contracts
- Robust contracting with additive noise
- Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
- Countervailing incentives in agency problems
- The Wage Policy of a Firm
- Optimal contracting with private knowledge of wealth and ability
- Value of communication in agencies
- Optimal contracting of separable production technologies
- Ex post participation constraint in a principal-agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard
- Noisy Observation in Adverse Selection Models
- Renegotiating moral hazard contracts under limited liability and monotonicity
Cited In (11)
- Endogenous selection and moral hazard in compensation contracts
- Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case
- Nonparametric identification of a contract model with adverse selection and moral hazard
- Optimal contracts under competition when uncertainty from adverse selection and moral hazard are present
- The optimal contract under adverse selection in a moral-hazard model with a risk-averse agent
- Optimal contracts for agents with adverse selection
- Simultaneous moral hazard and adverse selection with risk averse agents
- Simple contracts with double-sided moral hazard and adverse selection
- Dynamic contracts with moral hazard and adverse selection
- Multi-period contracts between principal and agent with adverse selection
- Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard
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