Optimal contract mechanisms for principal-agent problems with moral hazard and adverse selection

DOI10.1007/BF01229312zbMATH Open0810.90005OpenAlexW2119929931MaRDI QIDQ1338087FDOQ1338087

Authors: Frank H. jun. Page 

Publication date: 27 November 1994

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01229312

Recommendations

• The optimal contract under adverse selection in a moral-hazard model with a risk-averse agent
• Optimal contracts for agents with adverse selection
• Optimal contracts under competition when uncertainty from adverse selection and moral hazard are present
• Optimal contracting with moral hazard and behavioral preferences
• The existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems
• The existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model
• On the existence of optimal contract mechanisms for incomplete information principal-agent models
• Optimal principal agent contracts for a class of incentive schemes: A characterization and the rate of approach to efficiency
• Implementation of optimal contracts under adverse selection

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designincentive compatibilityincomplete information principal-agent problemsinfinite dimensional setting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Convex analysis and measurable multifunctions
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Measurable relations
• A generalization of a problem of Steinhaus
• On the upper and lower semicontinuity of the Aumann integral
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A sufficient condition for continuity of optimal sets in mathematical programming
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Temporary General Equilibrium in a Sequential Trading Model with Spot and Futures Transactions
• Optimal Plans for Dynamic Programming Problems
• Minimal Topological Spaces
• The existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model
• Multifunctions with values in a space of probability measures
• On pointwise convergence, compactness and equicontinuity in the lifting topology. I

Cited In (42)

• Optimizing maintenance service contracts through mechanism design theory
• Bank monitoring incentives under moral hazard and adverse selection
• Dominant strategy mechanisms for contract auctions with risk aversion and moral hazard
• Ex post participation constraint in a principal-agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard
• Optimal and robust contracts for a risk-constrained principal
• Bidding for incentive contracts
• Mechanism design for general screening problems with moral hazard
• An uncertain wage contract model for risk-averse worker under bilateral moral hazard
• Simple contracts under observable and hidden actions
• Threat-based incentive mechanisms under moral hazard and adverse selection
• A general existence result for the principal-agent problem with adverse selection
• An optimal reward contract against the manager's moral hazard with hidden information
• Implementation of optimal contracts under adverse selection
• Optimal selling mechanisms for multiproduct monopolists: Incentive compatibility in the presence of budget constraints
• Existence of optimal auctions in general environments
• Endogenous selection and moral hazard in compensation contracts
• On the continuity of expected utility
• Optimal stopping contract for public private partnerships under moral hazard
• Analysis of various optimal contracts in the problem of stimulation of agents by a principal in a model with two agents
• Existence of optimal mechanisms in principal-agent problems
• Optimal contract for the principal-agent under Knightian uncertainty
• Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints
• A penalty function method for the principal-agent problem with an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints under moral hazard
• Nonparametric identification of a contract model with adverse selection and moral hazard
• On the implementability of contracts without quasilinear utility
• The existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems
• The mathematics of principal-agent problem with adverse selection
• Optimal contracts under competition when uncertainty from adverse selection and moral hazard are present
• The optimal contract under adverse selection in a moral-hazard model with a risk-averse agent
• Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all?
• Optimal contracts for agents with adverse selection
• Monotonicity of optimal contracts without the first-order approach
• On the existence of optimal contract mechanisms for incomplete information principal-agent models
• Simultaneous moral hazard and adverse selection with risk averse agents
• Nonparametric adverse selection problems
• A principal-agent problem with heterogeneous demand distributions for a carbon capture and storage system
• Existence of solutions to principal-agent problems with adverse selection under minimal assumptions
• Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard
• Robust contracting in general contract spaces
• Principals competing for an agent in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard
• Existence and monotonicity of solutions to moral hazard problems
• Title not available (Why is that?)

This page was built for publication: Optimal contract mechanisms for principal-agent problems with moral hazard and adverse selection

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1338087)