Bidding for incentive contracts
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Publication:1633664
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.05.001zbMath1418.91275OpenAlexW2804776403WikidataQ129805169 ScholiaQ129805169MaRDI QIDQ1633664
Guillaume Roger, Benoît Julien
Publication date: 20 December 2018
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.05.001
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