Limits of exact equilibria for capacity constrained sellers with costly search.

DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2667zbMath1086.91501OpenAlexW2048740434MaRDI QIDQ5927613

Michael Peters

Publication date: 2000

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/public/workingPapers/UT-ECIPA-PETERS-98-01.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (15)

Auctions vs. fixed pricing: competing for budget constrained buyers ⋮ Bidding for incentive contracts ⋮ Uniqueness of equilibrium in directed search models ⋮ Competitive equilibrium with search frictions: a general equilibrium approach ⋮ High profit equilibria in directed search models ⋮ Wage-vacancy contracts and coordination frictions ⋮ On the foundations of competitive search equilibrium with and without market makers ⋮ Trading mechanism selection with directed search when buyers are risk averse ⋮ Multiple applications, competing mechanisms, and market power ⋮ Bidding for money ⋮ Competition among auctioneers in large markets ⋮ Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms ⋮ A theory of commerce ⋮ Directed search with multiple job applications ⋮ Competitive search with ex-post opportunism

Cites Work

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• Anonymous sequential games with aggregate uncertainty
• Bertrand Equilibrium with Capacity Constraints and Restricted Mobility
• Efficient and Competitive Rationing
• A Walrasian Theory of Markets with Adverse Selection
• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
• A Competitive Distribution of Auctions
• On the Equivalence of Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Equilibria in Contract Markets: The Case of Complete Contracts

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