A Competitive Distribution of Auctions
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Publication:4368671
DOI10.2307/2971742zbMATH Open0890.90043OpenAlexW1981882623MaRDI QIDQ4368671FDOQ4368671
Authors: Michael Peters 
Publication date: 4 December 1997
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2971742
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Cited In (33)
- On the foundations of competitive search equilibrium with and without market makers
- Limits of exact equilibria for capacity constrained sellers with costly search.
- MEETINGS AND MECHANISMS
- Identification and estimation in sequential, asymmetric, English auctions
- Directed search and optimal production
- Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms
- Verifiability and group formation in markets
- Principal-agent VCG contracts
- Auctions, public tenders, and fair division games: An axiomatic approach
- Directed search with endogenous capacity
- Indeterminacy and directed search.
- Auctions with noncompetitive sales
- On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition
- Seller competition by mechanism design
- Rubinstein auctions: On competition for bargaining partners
- Competition among auctioneers in large markets
- Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: two examples
- Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets
- Search frictions, competing mechanisms and optimal market segmentation
- Competing auctions with endogenous quantities
- Multiple applications, competing mechanisms, and market power
- Robust competitive auctions
- High profit equilibria in directed search models
- The Price of Anarchy in Auctions
- Sellers' implicit collusion in directed search markets
- Internet auctions with many traders
- Trading mechanism selection with directed search when buyers are risk averse
- The Conditional Auction Mechanism for Sharing a Surplus
- Who wants to be an auctioneer?
- A comparison of pricing rules for auctions and fair division games
- Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
- Competing trade mechanisms and monotone mechanism choice
- General competing mechanism games with strategy-proof punishment
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