Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices
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Publication:1367768
DOI10.1006/jeth.1997.2278zbMath0893.90045OpenAlexW2160640936MaRDI QIDQ1367768
Sergei Severinov, Michael Peters
Publication date: 22 July 1998
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/e79cf6774c981fcd6f062b7dccd923348cc4f5fb
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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Cites Work
- Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
- Equilibrium mechanisms in a decentralized market
- Competition in transactions mechanisms: The emergence of price competition
- Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
- Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions
- Dynamic Markets with Competitive Bidding
- Efficient and Competitive Rationing
- Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
