High profit equilibria in directed search models
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Publication:625049
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.08.006zbMath1205.91075OpenAlexW1998995727MaRDI QIDQ625049
Publication date: 11 February 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.08.006
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (8)
Auctions vs. fixed pricing: competing for budget constrained buyers ⋮ Competing mechanisms with multi-unit consumer demand ⋮ Dynamic directed search ⋮ Buyer's equilibrium with capacity constraints and restricted mobility: a recursive approach ⋮ DIRECTED SEARCH AND THE BERTRAND PARADOX ⋮ Uniqueness of equilibrium in directed search models ⋮ Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms ⋮ Equilibrium wage rigidity in directed search
Cites Work
- Directed search and optimal production
- Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms
- A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
- Equivalence of auctions and posted prices
- Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices
- Indeterminacy and directed search.
- Directed Search for Equilibrium Wage-Tenure Contracts
- Equilibrium Price Dispersion
- Bertrand Equilibrium with Capacity Constraints and Restricted Mobility
- Equilibrium Distributions of Sales and Advertising Prices
- Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-Steady States
- Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
- A Competitive Distribution of Auctions
- Competing auctions: Finite markets and convergence
- Limits of exact equilibria for capacity constrained sellers with costly search.
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