Competing mechanisms with multi-unit consumer demand

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.06.001MaRDI QIDQ1622353zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors James Peck

Publication date 19 November 2018

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.06.001

zbMATH Keywords

competing mechanismsentry feesmulti-unit demand

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

Recommendations

• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
• A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
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• Seller competition by mechanism design
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Cites work

• A folk theorem for competing mechanisms
• A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
• Bertrand Equilibrium with Capacity Constraints and Restricted Mobility
• Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices
• Definable and contractible contracts
• High profit equilibria in directed search models
• Indeterminacy and directed search.
• Internet auctions with many traders
• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
• Optimal auctions revisited
• Price competition in a capacity-constrained duopoly
• Sequential contracting with multiple principals
• Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty

Cited in

(3)

• Competition in transactions mechanisms: The emergence of price competition
• Giffen Demand for Several Goods
• Too much waste, not enough rationing: the failure of stochastic, competitive markets

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