A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
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Cites work
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1047691 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3232606 (Why is no real title available?)
- "Beliefs about Beliefs" without Probabilities
- Auctions of Shares
- Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices
- Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading
- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
- Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
- Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions
- Infinite dimensional analysis. A hitchhiker's guide
- Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
- Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
- On the Equivalence of Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Equilibria in Contract Markets: The Case of Complete Contracts
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
- Random capacities and their distributions
- Topology-free typology of beliefs
Cited in
(37)- Private communication in competing mechanism games
- On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard
- Universality of the Epstein-Wang type structure
- MEETINGS AND MECHANISMS
- A commitment folk theorem
- On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations
- Directed search and optimal production
- A continuous-time analysis of optimal restructuring of contracts with costly information disclosure
- Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms
- Menu theorems for bilateral contracting
- Deterministic mechanisms and the revelation principle
- Price competition for an informed buyer
- On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
- Sequential contracting with multiple principals
- Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games
- Indeterminacy and directed search.
- Seller competition by mechanism design
- On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition
- Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency.
- Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: two examples
- Interacting mechanisms: a perspective on generalized principal-agent problems
- Search frictions, competing mechanisms and optimal market segmentation
- Common agency with informed principals: menus \textit{and} signals
- Non-exclusive dynamic contracts, competition, and the limits of insurance
- A model of competing selling mechanisms
- High profit equilibria in directed search models
- Robust competitive auctions
- Equilibrium (non-)existence in games with competing principals
- Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness
- Subjective states: a more robust model
- Sellers' implicit collusion in directed search markets
- Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences
- Reciprocal contracting
- Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents
- Competing mechanisms with multi-unit consumer demand
- A folk theorem for competing mechanisms
- General competing mechanism games with strategy-proof punishment
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