A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
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Publication:1125569
DOI10.1006/JETH.1999.2542zbMATH Open0958.91015OpenAlexW2167320298MaRDI QIDQ1125569FDOQ1125569
Authors: Larry G. Epstein, Michael Peters 
Publication date: 8 April 2001
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2542
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Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44) General equilibrium theory (91B50)
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Cited In (37)
- Private communication in competing mechanism games
- MEETINGS AND MECHANISMS
- On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard
- Universality of the Epstein-Wang type structure
- A commitment folk theorem
- On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations
- Directed search and optimal production
- A continuous-time analysis of optimal restructuring of contracts with costly information disclosure
- Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms
- Menu theorems for bilateral contracting
- Deterministic mechanisms and the revelation principle
- Price competition for an informed buyer
- On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
- Sequential contracting with multiple principals
- Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games
- Indeterminacy and directed search.
- On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition
- Seller competition by mechanism design
- Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency.
- Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: two examples
- Interacting mechanisms: a perspective on generalized principal-agent problems
- Search frictions, competing mechanisms and optimal market segmentation
- A model of competing selling mechanisms
- Common agency with informed principals: menus \textit{and} signals
- Non-exclusive dynamic contracts, competition, and the limits of insurance
- Robust competitive auctions
- Equilibrium (non-)existence in games with competing principals
- High profit equilibria in directed search models
- Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness
- Subjective states: a more robust model
- Sellers' implicit collusion in directed search markets
- Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences
- Reciprocal contracting
- Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents
- Competing mechanisms with multi-unit consumer demand
- A folk theorem for competing mechanisms
- General competing mechanism games with strategy-proof punishment
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