Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness

DOI10.1007/s10058-012-0116-8zbMath1282.91172MaRDI QIDQ1929139

Uday Rajan, Andrea Attar, Gwenaël Piaser, Eloisa Campioni

Publication date: 7 January 2013

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-012-0116-8

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazard; simple mechanisms; multiple-principal multiple-agent

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition

Cites Work

• On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard
• Menu theorems for bilateral contracting
• On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts
• A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency.
• Two-sided communication in competing mechanism games
• A folk theorem for competing mechanisms
• Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games
• Mechanism Games With Multiple Principals and Three or More Agents
• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
• Games Played Through Agents
• The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games