Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness
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Publication:1929139
DOI10.1007/S10058-012-0116-8zbMath1282.91172OpenAlexW1971827718MaRDI QIDQ1929139
Uday Rajan, Andrea Attar, Gwenaël Piaser, Eloisa Campioni
Publication date: 7 January 2013
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-012-0116-8
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Cites Work
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- The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
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