Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies

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Publication:1214347

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8zbMath0297.90106OpenAlexW2112794046WikidataQ59411029 ScholiaQ59411029MaRDI QIDQ1214347

Robert John Aumann

Publication date: 1974

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8




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