Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans
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Publication:1121812
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90127-0zbMath0674.90106OpenAlexW2073421029MaRDI QIDQ1121812
Publication date: 1989
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/691.pdf
Related Items
Two-person bargaining with verifiable information ⋮ Negotiation statements with promise and threat ⋮ Communication between rational agents ⋮ Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information ⋮ Refining cheap-talk equilibria ⋮ Cheap talk games may have unique, informative equilibrium outcomes ⋮ Communication, correlation, and symmetry in bargaining ⋮ Theories of coalitional rationality ⋮ Reaching agreements through argumentation: a logical model and implementation
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