Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90127-0MaRDI QIDQ1121812zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Roger B. Myerson

Publication date 1989

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/691.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Coherent planssequential gamessequential negotiation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Review text

A general model is first developed to formulate static and sequential negotiation statements, and criteria are developed to determine their credibility. Coherent plans are then defined, and their existence is proved. Well constructed examples illustrate these concepts.

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• A General Framework for Argumentation-Based Negotiation

Cites work

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• Convex Analysis
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3137856 (Why is no real title available?)
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Cited in

(11)

• Theories of coalitional rationality
• Refining cheap-talk equilibria
• Cheap talk games may have unique, informative equilibrium outcomes
• Communication, correlation, and symmetry in bargaining
• Reaching agreements through argumentation: a logical model and implementation
• Two-person bargaining with verifiable information
• Negotiation statements with promise and threat
• Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7503170 (Why is no real title available?)
• Meaning in communication games
• Communication between rational agents

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