Theories of coalitional rationality
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1007326
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2007.03.010zbMath1158.91309OpenAlexW2154805931MaRDI QIDQ1007326
Publication date: 20 March 2009
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3204917
Related Items (6)
Coalitional stochastic stability ⋮ Iterated elimination procedures ⋮ Shared intentions: the evolution of collaboration ⋮ Watercooler chat, organizational structure and corporate culture ⋮ Bayesian coalitional rationalizability ⋮ Agency, potential and contagion
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium
- Communication between rational agents
- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
- Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans
- Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
- Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games
- Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
- Renegotiation in repeated games
- Topology-free typology of beliefs
- A theory of endogenous coalition structures
- Renegotiation and symmetry in repeated games
- A model of pre-game communication
- Farsighted coalitional stability
- Preference, rationalizability and equilibrium
- Equilibrium binding agreements
- A model of agreements in strategic form games
- Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
- Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
- Rationality and coherent theories of strategic behavior
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Coalitional Rationalizability*
- A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
- Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games
- A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
This page was built for publication: Theories of coalitional rationality
