A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
- Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks
- Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining
- Bargaining one-dimensional social choices
- Contracting with externalities and outside options
- Coalition formation in games with externalities
- A noncooperative solution to a two-person bargaining game
- An Interior-Point Differentiable Path-Following Method to Compute Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Games
- One-to-many bargaining when pairwise agreements are non-renegotiable
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 18245 (Why is no real title available?)
- Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games
- Dynamic coalitional equilibrium
- Outside options, component efficiency, and stability
- A noncooperative foundation of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution
- ONE-SELLER/TWO-BUYER MARKETS WITH BUYER EXTERNALITIES AND (IM)PERFECT COMPETITION
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 18241 (Why is no real title available?)
- Bargaining and cooperation in strategic form games with suspended realizations of threats
- Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core
- Games in sequencing situations with externalities
- The Nash bargaining solution in general \(n\)-person cooperative games
- Recontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games
- Transparency, complementarity and holdout
- Rent-seeking and surplus destruction in unanimity bargaining
- A dynamic bargaining game with externalities
- Forming coalitions and the Shapley NTU value
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1487836 (Why is no real title available?)
- Simulating a sequential coalition formation process for the climate change problem: first come, but second served?
- Stationary perfect equilibria of an \(n\)-person noncooperative bargaining game and cooperative solution concepts
- Equivalent conditions for the existence of an efficient equilibrium in coalitional bargaining with externalities and renegotiations
- Labor unions and Nash bargaining using coalition formation games
- A one-stage model of link formation and payoff division
- Majority rule in a stochastic model of bargaining
- Coalition-then-allocation legislative bargaining
- Mechanism robustness in multilateral bargaining
- Bidding rings: a bargaining approach
- An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations
- Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core
- Sequential formation of alliances in survival contests
- Perturbed adaptive dynamics in coalition form games
- Existence of share equilibrium in symmetric local public good economies
- Negotiation, preferences over agreements, and the core
- Coalitional bargaining with consistent counterfactuals
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4077003 (Why is no real title available?)
- Coalition formation as a dynamic process.
- Noncooperative selection of the core
- Dynamic bargaining with voluntary participation and externalities
- Coalitional bargaining with competition to make offers
- Proto-coalition bargaining and the core
- Olson vs. Coase: coalitional worth in conflict
- The lattice structure of the S-Lorenz core
- Coalition preclusion contracts and moderate policies
- Coalitional bargaining games: a new concept of value and coalition formation
- External pressure on alliances: what does the prisoners' dilemma reveal?
- Assembly problems
- Mergers and acquisitions with conditional and unconditional offers
- A noncooperative foundation of the competitive divisions for bads
- Theories of coalitional rationality
- An alternative proof of uniqueness in non-cooperative bargaining
- Existence and efficiency of a stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium in coalitional bargaining models with nonsuperadditive payoffs
- Anytime coalition structure generation: an average case study
- Rubinstein auctions: On competition for bargaining partners
- Bargaining over strategies of non-cooperative games
- A model of protocoalition bargaining with breakdown probability
- Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation
- Bargaining and membership
- Bargaining and bargaining sets.
- Dynamic multilateral markets
- Equilibrium analysis in majority-based coalitional bargaining games
- Rejecter-proposer legislative bargaining with heterogeneous time and risk preferences
- The production and cost-sharing of an excludable public good
- Decentralized matching: the role of commitment
- Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities
- Uniqueness in random-proposer multilateral bargaining
- Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions
- Robust equilibria in tournaments
- The price of fairness with the extended Perles-Maschler solution
- Bargaining failures and merger policy
- Computing perfect stationary equilibria in stochastic games
- Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games
- Bargaining cum voice
- Multilateral non-cooperative bargaining in a general utility space
- Delay, multiplicity, and non-existence of equilibrium in unanimity bargaining games
- Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core
- Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition
- A note on selection of proposers in coalitional bargaining
- De Facto Delegation and Proposer Rules
- Collective hold‐up
- Bargaining delay under partial breakdowns and externalities
- Solving coalitional resource games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 18243 (Why is no real title available?)
- Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in majority games
- Bargaining with non-convexities
- Costless delay in negotiations
- A model of pre-electoral coalition formation
- Simple collective equilibria in stopping games
- Multi-lateral strategic bargaining without stationarity
- How best to disagree in order to agree?
- Bargaining in committees as an extension of Nash's bargaining theory
- Strongly stable networks
- Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game: experimental evidence
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