A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
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Publication:5289342
DOI10.2307/2298067zbMATH Open0776.90092OpenAlexW2080745530MaRDI QIDQ5289342FDOQ5289342
Authors: Kalyan Chatterjee, Bhaskar Dutta, Debraj Ray, Kunal Sengupta 
Publication date: 23 August 1993
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2298067
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- Bargaining one-dimensional social choices
- Contracting with externalities and outside options
- Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining
- One-to-many bargaining when pairwise agreements are non-renegotiable
- Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games
- Dynamic coalitional equilibrium
- Outside options, component efficiency, and stability
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The Nash bargaining solution in general \(n\)-person cooperative games
- Recontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games
- Transparency, complementarity and holdout
- Forming coalitions and the Shapley NTU value
- Equivalent conditions for the existence of an efficient equilibrium in coalitional bargaining with externalities and renegotiations
- A one-stage model of link formation and payoff division
- Stationary perfect equilibria of an \(n\)-person noncooperative bargaining game and cooperative solution concepts
- Simulating a sequential coalition formation process for the climate change problem: first come, but second served?
- Labor unions and Nash bargaining using coalition formation games
- Bidding rings: a bargaining approach
- Majority rule in a stochastic model of bargaining
- Mechanism robustness in multilateral bargaining
- An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations
- Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core
- Perturbed adaptive dynamics in coalition form games
- Dynamic bargaining with voluntary participation and externalities
- Negotiation, preferences over agreements, and the core
- Coalitional bargaining with consistent counterfactuals
- Coalition formation as a dynamic process.
- Noncooperative selection of the core
- Coalitional bargaining with competition to make offers
- Olson vs. Coase: coalitional worth in conflict
- Coalitional bargaining games: a new concept of value and coalition formation
- Coalition preclusion contracts and moderate policies
- Theories of coalitional rationality
- An alternative proof of uniqueness in non-cooperative bargaining
- Rubinstein auctions: On competition for bargaining partners
- Bargaining over strategies of non-cooperative games
- Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation
- Bargaining and bargaining sets.
- Bargaining and membership
- Rejecter-proposer legislative bargaining with heterogeneous time and risk preferences
- Uniqueness in random-proposer multilateral bargaining
- Decentralized matching: the role of commitment
- Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions
- Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities
- The price of fairness with the extended Perles-Maschler solution
- Multilateral non-cooperative bargaining in a general utility space
- Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition
- Bargaining delay under partial breakdowns and externalities
- Bargaining with non-convexities
- Bargaining in committees as an extension of Nash's bargaining theory
- Strongly stable networks
- Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game: experimental evidence
- Stochastic stability under logit choice in coalitional bargaining problems
- On the convergence to the Nash bargaining solution for action-dependent bargaining protocols
- Altruism, spite and competition in bargaining games
- Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: theory and application
- Consistency, converse consistency, and aspirations in TU-games.
- Multilateral negotiations and formation of coalitions
- Dynamics of Profit-Sharing Games
- Perfect equilibria of a model of \(n\)-person noncooperative bargaining
- A theory of endogenous coalition structures
- Nash bargaining solution under externalities
- Endogenous formation of networks for local public goods
- A bargaining theory of the firm
- The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation
- Characterization of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set in a non-cooperative model of dynamic policy-making with a persistent agenda setter
- Rational cooperation
- Note on the equal split solution in an \(n\)-person noncooperative bargaining game
- A solution for bargaining problems with coalition structure
- Efficient coalitional bargaining with noncontingent offers
- The coalitional Nash bargaining solution
- Bargaining with commitments
- Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction
- Coalitional bargaining in networks
- Non-cooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel.
- The Condorcet paradox revisited
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
- Existence of stationary bargaining equilibria
- A noncooperative solution to a two-person bargaining game
- A noncooperative foundation of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution
- Bargaining and cooperation in strategic form games with suspended realizations of threats
- Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Rent-seeking and surplus destruction in unanimity bargaining
- A dynamic bargaining game with externalities
- Coalition-then-allocation legislative bargaining
- Existence of share equilibrium in symmetric local public good economies
- Proto-coalition bargaining and the core
- Anytime coalition structure generation: an average case study
- Existence and efficiency of a stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium in coalitional bargaining models with nonsuperadditive payoffs
- A model of protocoalition bargaining with breakdown probability
- Dynamic multilateral markets
- The production and cost-sharing of an excludable public good
- Bargaining failures and merger policy
- Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games
- Bargaining cum voice
- Delay, multiplicity, and non-existence of equilibrium in unanimity bargaining games
- Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core
- A note on selection of proposers in coalitional bargaining
- Solving coalitional resource games
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