A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
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Publication:5289342
DOI10.2307/2298067zbMATH Open0776.90092OpenAlexW2080745530MaRDI QIDQ5289342FDOQ5289342
Authors: Kalyan Chatterjee, Bhaskar Dutta, Debraj Ray, Kunal Sengupta 
Publication date: 23 August 1993
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2298067
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- Rent-seeking and surplus destruction in unanimity bargaining
- A dynamic bargaining game with externalities
- Coalition-then-allocation legislative bargaining
- Existence of share equilibrium in symmetric local public good economies
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- Anytime coalition structure generation: an average case study
- Existence and efficiency of a stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium in coalitional bargaining models with nonsuperadditive payoffs
- A model of protocoalition bargaining with breakdown probability
- Dynamic multilateral markets
- The production and cost-sharing of an excludable public good
- Bargaining failures and merger policy
- Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games
- Bargaining cum voice
- Delay, multiplicity, and non-existence of equilibrium in unanimity bargaining games
- Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core
- A note on selection of proposers in coalitional bargaining
- Solving coalitional resource games
- Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in majority games
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- Consistent bargaining conjectures in marriage and matching
- Odd man out: The proposal-making model
- A noncooperative bargaining game with endogenous protocol and partial breakdown
- A non-cooperative foundation for the continuous Raiffa solution
- Endogenous mergers in markets with vertically differentiated products
- A repeated coalitional bargaining model
- A one-period memory folk theorem for multilateral bargaining games
- A meta-allocation mechanism in cooperative bargaining
- Bidding and sequential coalition formation with externalities
- A minimal sufficient set of procedures in a bargaining model
- Subgame perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model with deterministic procedures
- The recursive core for non-superadditive games
- REFINEMENTS OF NASH EQUILIBRIA IN VIEW OF JEALOUS OR FRIENDLY BEHAVIOR OF PLAYERS
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- Equilibrium computation of the Hart and Mas-Colell bargaining model
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- ONE-SELLER/TWO-BUYER MARKETS WITH BUYER EXTERNALITIES AND (IM)PERFECT COMPETITION
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- The lattice structure of the S-Lorenz core
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- A model of pre-electoral coalition formation
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- Dynamic bargaining with voluntary participation and externalities
- Negotiation, preferences over agreements, and the core
- Coalitional bargaining with consistent counterfactuals
- Coalition formation as a dynamic process.
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- Coalitional bargaining with competition to make offers
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