Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2018.03.007MaRDI QIDQ1748376zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Andrey Meshalkin, Arkadi Predtetchinski

Publication date 9 May 2018

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/7716b1f5-7d4c-4e45-967c-4bc24a896452

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingdelay of acceptancedynamic gamesmajoritarian votingsubgame perfect equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model
• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
• A one-period memory folk theorem for multilateral bargaining games
• Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem
• Experiments in Majoritarian Bargaining
• Game theory
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099354 (Why is no real title available?)
• Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
• Legislative bargaining with teams
• Markov perfect equilibrium. I: Observable actions
• Non-cooperative bargaining of N 3 players
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
• Veto power in committees: An experimental study

Cited in

(11)

• Two-person bargaining behavior in fixed discounting factors games with infinite horizon
• Majority rule in a stochastic model of bargaining
• Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: theory and experiments
• Subgame perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model with deterministic procedures
• A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game
• Folk theorems in a bargaining game with endogenous protocol
• Legislative bargaining with teams
• Experiments in Majoritarian Bargaining
• Efficiency and surplus distribution in majoritarian reputational bargaining
• Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in majority games
• Folk theorem under bankruptcy

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