Veto power in committees: An experimental study

DOI10.1007/S10683-010-9234-8MaRDI QIDQ975367zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors John H. Kagel, Hankyoung Sung, Eyal Winter

Publication date 9 June 2010

Published in Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-010-9234-8

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingcommitteesveto power

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments
• Quantitative evaluation of veto power
• Voting by veto and the role of the compromise function
• Properties of voting with veto power
• Veto players and non-cooperative foundations of power in legislative bargaining

Cites work

• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• A theory of sequential reciprocity
• Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers
• Experiments in Majoritarian Bargaining
• Gaining power through enlargement: strategic foundations and experimental evidence
• Gamson's Law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory
• Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests

Cited in

(15)

• Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: theory and experiments
• Meaningful learning in weighted voting games: an experiment
• Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining
• Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments
• Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: an experimental analysis
• Gambler's fallacy and imperfect best response in legislative bargaining
• Pork versus public goods: an experimental study of public good provision within a legislative bargaining framework
• A dynamic model of a decision making body where the power of veto can be invoked
• A methodological note on a weighted voting experiment
• Quantitative evaluation of veto power
• Unanimous rules in the laboratory
• A theory of voting patterns and performance in private and public committees
• Multilateral bargaining over the division of losses
• Endogenous limits on veto power in dynamic bargaining
• Gaining power through enlargement: strategic foundations and experimental evidence

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