Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: theory and experiments
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Publication:1691350
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.003zbMath1393.91092OpenAlexW3124018028WikidataQ59418512 ScholiaQ59418512MaRDI QIDQ1691350
Maria Montero, Christoph Vanberg, Luis M. Miller
Publication date: 16 January 2018
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/48836/
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)
Related Items (4)
Collective intertemporal decisions and heterogeneity in groups ⋮ Pledge-and-review in the laboratory ⋮ Stress-testing the runoff rule in the laboratory ⋮ Bargaining with costly competition for the right to propose
Uses Software
Cites Work
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