A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game
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Publication:1876648
DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00259-XzbMath1106.91018MaRDI QIDQ1876648
Publication date: 20 August 2004
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00259-x
dynamic games; legislative bargaining; Markov perfect Nash equilibrium; stage undominated voting strategies; three person game
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