A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game
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Publication:1876648
DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00259-XzbMath1106.91018OpenAlexW2105321334MaRDI QIDQ1876648
Publication date: 20 August 2004
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00259-x
dynamic gameslegislative bargainingMarkov perfect Nash equilibriumstage undominated voting strategiesthree person game
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