Dynamic stable set as a tournament solution
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Publication:892846
DOI10.1007/s00355-015-0897-0zbMath1341.91015OpenAlexW2111345938MaRDI QIDQ892846
Publication date: 12 November 2015
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0897-0
Related Items (2)
Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory ⋮ Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set rationalization of choice functions
Cites Work
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