Dynamic stable set as a tournament solution

DOI10.1007/S00355-015-0897-0zbMATH Open1341.91015OpenAlexW2111345938MaRDI QIDQ892846FDOQ892846

Hannu Vartiainen

Publication date: 12 November 2015

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0897-0

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cited In (7)

• Minimal stable sets in tournaments
• Stable sets of weak tournaments
• A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions
• On the tournament equilibrium set
• Tournament-stable equilibria
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set rationalization of choice functions
• Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory

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