A new old solution for weak tournaments

DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0561-2MaRDI QIDQ2450153zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Vincent Anesi

Publication date 16 May 2014

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://orbilu.uni.lu/handle/10993/44306

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Applications of game theory (91A80)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
• A note on the core and von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions of simple games
• A survey on the complexity of tournament solutions
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• Choosing from a tournament
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• Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets
• Comparison functions and choice correspondences
• Condorcet choice correspondences for weak tournaments
• Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence
• Dutta's minimal covering set and Shapley's saddles
• Mixed refinements of Shapley's saddles and weak tournaments
• Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games
• Robustness of the median voter result
• STABLE SETS FOR SIMPLE GAMES WITH ORDINAL PREFERENCES
• The Computational Complexity of Choice Sets
• The bipartisan set of a tournament game
• The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
• Tournament solutions and majority voting

Cited in

(7)

• Weakening arcs in tournaments
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set rationalization of choice functions
• How can an elimination tournament favor a weaker player?
• Dynamic stable set as a tournament solution
• On the structure of stable tournament solutions
• Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players
• Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory

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