A new old solution for weak tournaments
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Publication:2450153
DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0561-2zbMATH Open1287.91054OpenAlexW1990925071MaRDI QIDQ2450153FDOQ2450153
Authors: Vincent Anesi 
Publication date: 16 May 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://orbilu.uni.lu/handle/10993/44306
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Cites Work
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- Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games
- Candidates with policy preferences: A dynamic model
- A survey on the complexity of tournament solutions
- Choosing from a tournament
- Dutta's minimal covering set and Shapley's saddles
- Condorcet choice correspondences for weak tournaments
- Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets
- Comparison functions and choice correspondences
- Mixed refinements of Shapley's saddles and weak tournaments
- Robustness of the median voter result
- A note on the core and von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions of simple games
Cited In (7)
- How can an elimination tournament favor a weaker player?
- Weakening arcs in tournaments
- Dynamic stable set as a tournament solution
- Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players
- On the structure of stable tournament solutions
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set rationalization of choice functions
- Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory
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