Tournament solutions and majority voting
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
Cited in
(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Uncovered set choice rules
- Choosing from a large tournament
- Approximability of Dodgson's rule
- Voting by eliminating quantifiers
- A survey on the complexity of tournament solutions
- On the complexity of Slater's problems
- Neighborhood monotonicity, the extended Zermelo model, and symmetric knockout tournaments
- Tournament methods in choice theory
- Majority tournaments: Sincere and sophisticated voting decisions under amendment procedure
- On -majority voting paradoxes
- A consistent tournament solution
- Jeffrey Scot Banks (1958--2000)
- On two new social choice correspondences.
- Choosing from a weighted tournament
- Introduction to political science
- Distributive politics and electoral competition
- Voting by successive elimination and strategic candidacy
- Extending tournament solutions
- Absolute qualified majoritarianism: how does the threshold matter?
- Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving
- On the structure of stable tournament solutions
- Fixing balanced knockout and double elimination tournaments
- How to identify experts in a community?
- Characterizations of the 3-cycle count and backward length of a tournament
- Tournament games and Condorcet voting
- The stability set as a social choice correspondence.
- On a compromise social choice correspondence
- The Dodgson ranking and the Borda count: a binary comparison
- Preferences for multi-attributed alternatives: traces, dominance, and numerical representations
- Sophisticated voting rules: The case of two tournaments
- Accessibility measures to nodes of directed graphs using solutions for generalized cooperative games
- Representation in majority tournaments
- Fair elimination-type competitions
- Group decisions from individual rankings: the Borda-Condorcet rule
- Margin of victory for tournament solutions
- Reasoning about general preference relations
- Majority-approval social choice
- Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory
- The solution of generalized stable sets and its refinement
- On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules
- Paired comparisons analysis: an axiomatic approach to ranking methods
- Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox
- \(k\)-majority digraphs and the hardness of voting with a constant number of voters
- A graph interpretation of the least squares ranking method
- Condorcet winning sets
- Bounds on the disparity and separation of tournament solutions
- The legislative calendar
- Modeling optimal social choice: matrix-vector representation of various solution concepts based on majority rule
- Minimal extending sets in tournaments
- The flow network method
- Strategy-proof preference aggregation: possibilities and characterizations
- A new old solution for weak tournaments
- A counterexample to a conjecture of Schwartz
- In quest of the Banks set in spatial voting games
- A note on contestation-based tournament solutions
- The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension
- Weakened WARP and top-cycle choice rules
- Transitivity frameworks for reciprocal relations: cycle-transitivity versus \(FG\)-transitivity
- Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model
- Scoring of web pages and tournaments-axiomatizations
- Preference-based reinforcement learning: evolutionary direct policy search using a preference-based racing algorithm
- Tournaments without acyclic interval.
- Optimal strategies for node selection games on oriented graphs: skew matrices and symmetric games
- Properties of multiwinner voting rules
- Strategy-proofness of the randomized Condorcet voting system
- A refinement of the uncovered set in tournaments
- A survey on the linear ordering problem for weighted or unweighted tournaments
- An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery schemes
- Structural stability of coalitions: a formal model highlighting the role of participants positioned between members and neutral actors
- Homomorphism complexes, reconfiguration, and homotopy for directed graphs
- On the reversal bias of the minimax social choice correspondence
- Representative democracy and the implementation of majority-preferred alternatives
- Axioms for centrality scoring with principal eigenvectors
- Control of Condorcet voting: complexity and a relation-algebraic approach
- The Computational Complexity of Choice Sets
- Transitive convex subsets in large tournaments
- The Condorcet set: majority voting over interconnected propositions
- Computing minimal extending sets by relation-algebraic modeling and development
- Internal slackening scoring methods
- Renegotiation perfection in infinite games
- Identifying stable network structures and sets of key players using a \(W\)-covering perspective
- Condorcet-consistent and approximately strategyproof tournament rules
- Ranking journals in sociology, education, and public administration by social choice theory methods
- Intersections of random hypergraphs and tournaments
- Minimal retentive sets in tournaments
- Can strategizing in round-robin subtournaments be avoided?
- On different ranking methods
- On the solution of \(w\)-stable sets
- Tournament solutions
- Voting procedures, complexity of
- Strategic manipulation in tournament games
- Dynamic coalitional equilibrium
- Who can win a single-elimination tournament?
- A social choice theory of legitimacy
- The Banks Set and the Uncovered Set in Budget Allocation Problems
- Robust bounds on choosing from large tournaments
- Hyper-stable social welfare functions
- Robust bounds on choosing from large tournaments
- Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures
- Centrality measures in networks
This page was built for publication: Tournament solutions and majority voting
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1366685)
