Recommendations
Cites work
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- Alternate definitions of the uncovered set and their implications
- Choice by elimination
- Comparison functions and choice correspondences
- Condorcet choice correspondences for weak tournaments
- Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence
- Cyclic tournaments and cooperative majority voting: A solution
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- On the possibility of reasonable consistent majoritarian choice: Some positive results
- Social choice and individual values
- Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
- Stability of decision systems under majority rule
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Theory of games and economic behavior.
- Tournament solutions and majority voting
- Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules
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