A social choice theory of legitimacy
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Publication:537545
DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0509-YzbMATH Open1232.91601OpenAlexW2069994264MaRDI QIDQ537545FDOQ537545
Authors: John W. Patty, Elizabeth Maggie Penn 
Publication date: 20 May 2011
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0509-y
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Cites Work
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- On the possibility of reasonable consistent majoritarian choice: Some positive results
- Cyclic tournaments and cooperative majority voting: A solution
- Condorcet choice correspondences for weak tournaments
- Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules
- Comparison functions and choice correspondences
- Alternate definitions of the uncovered set and their implications
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