Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result

Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)

New problems in the general choice theory
On anonymous and weighted voting systems
Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy
The anarchy of scheduling without money
Reaching consensus: solidarity and strategic properties in binary social choice
Peter J. Hammond
Social choice rules implemented in dominant strategies
On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences
Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters
Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities
Social choice and cooperative game theory: voting games as social aggregation functions
Strategy-proofness of scoring allocation correspondences for indivisible goods
An interview with Michael Dummett: From analytical philosophy to voting analysis and beyond
Self-consistency of decision rules for group decision making
On single-peaked domains and min-max rules
Strategic voting and nomination
Distortion of preferences, income distribution, and the case for a linear income tax
Discrete Mathematics in Voting and Group Choice
Nash Q-learning agents in Hotelling's model: reestablishing equilibrium
Restricted domains, Arrow social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private and public alternatives
Expert advice to a voting body
Common agency with informed principals: menus \textit{and} signals
Symmetry and impartial lotteries
Spatial implementation
Characterizations of strategy-proof mechanisms for excludable versus nonexcludable public projects
Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability
Social choice trade-off results for conditions on triples of alternatives
Manipulation of the Pareto semi-optimal rule
Impossibility theorems are modified and unified
The informational basis of scoring rules
Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on the cobb-Douglas domain of exchange economies
Symmetry, voting, and social choice
Existence of stable situations, restricted preferences, and strategic manipulation under democratic group decision rules
Strategic behaviour and a notion of ex ante efficiency in a voting model
Collective rationality and strategy-proofness of group decision rules
A condition for Nash-stability under binary and democratic group decision functions
Recovering non-monotonicity problems of voting rules
Strategy-proof estimators for simple regression.
Decomposable effectivity functions
Strategy-proofness of the randomized Condorcet voting system
Distance restricted manipulation in voting
A note on allocations attainable through Nash equilibria
The nonmanipulative vote-deficits of voting rules
A topological approach to the Arrow impossibility theorem when individual preferences are weak orders
A topological proof of Eliaz's unified theorem of social choice theory
Voting Procedures, Complexity of
Incentive compatibility and informational requirements
Power structure and cardinality restrictions for Paretian social choice rules
Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation
Strategic equilibria and decisive set structures for social choice mechanisms
Auction design with costly preference elicitation
Representations of simple games by social choice functions
A new perspective on implementation by voting trees
Studies in Computational Aspects of Voting
Judge: Don't Vote!
Strategy-proofness on restricted separable domains
Social choice theory in HOL. Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite
The impact of voters' preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes
Mechanism Design
An alternative proof of Fishburn's axiomatization of lexicographic preferences
Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights
Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains
The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models
A control-theoretic view on incentives
Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped
A note on the incompatibility of strategy-proofness and Pareto-optimality in quasi-linear settings with public budgets
Gerrymander-proof representative democracies
Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
Tops-only domains
Egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms in the allocation of heterogeneous objects
Externalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights
Efficient compromising
Mechanism design with model specification
Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains
On strategy-proof social choice correspondences
Mechanism design by observant and informed planners
Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model
A unifying impossibility theorem
Manipulability of choice aggregations
Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
Manipulation of social choice functions
Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures
Incentive compatibility and incomplete information
The complexity of priced control in elections
Control of Condorcet voting: complexity and a relation-algebraic approach
Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
Non-bossiness
Consistency in house allocation problems
Complexity of and algorithms for the manipulation of Borda, Nanson's and Baldwin's voting rules
Manipulation can be hard in tractable voting systems even for constant-sized coalitions
Coalitional strategy-proofness in economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object
On the equivalence of the Arrow impossibility theorem and the Brouwer fixed point theorem when individual preferences are weak orders
Efficient assignment with interdependent values
Incompleteness and incomparability in preference aggregation: complexity results
Picking the winners
House allocation with existing tenants
Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness
On the generic impossibility of truthful behavior: A simple approach
On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules

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