Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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Publication:4090165
DOI10.2307/1914083zbMATH Open0325.90081OpenAlexW2043715088WikidataQ55869235 ScholiaQ55869235MaRDI QIDQ4090165FDOQ4090165
Authors: Allan F. Gibbard
Publication date: 1973
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/a24b4e0b06cb0c26d44f0fc86fa0a1ecfc4d13b1
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- Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences
- Manipulation under majority decision-making when no majority suffers and preferences are strict
- Strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in economies with pure public goods.
- Strategy-proof coalition formation
- A social choice theory of legitimacy
- How to choose a non-controversial list with \(k\) names
- Researching with whom? Stability and manipulation
- Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
- Locally robust implementation and its limits
- Another direct proof for the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- Restricted domains, Arrow-social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private alternatives
- Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities
- A method for eliciting utilities and its application to collective choice
- Disjunctive merging: quota and Gmin merging operators
- Consensus rules for committee elections
- Double deception: Two against one in three-person games
- Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case
- Implementation in generalized matching problems
- On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness
- Deterministic mechanisms and the revelation principle
- Decision-making in organizations: when to delegate and whom to delegate
- Characterizing referenda with quorums via strategy-proofness
- Two-person game forms guaranteeing the stability against commitment and delaying tactics
- The geometry of Black's single peakedness and related conditions
- Choice Functions on Tree Quasi-Orders
- Voting under constraints
- Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
- Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule
- Economic juries and public project provision
- Monotone strategyproofness
- On the manipulation of social choice correspondences
- On the alternating use of ``unanimity and ``surjectivity in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- Children crying at birthday parties. Why?
- Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness
- Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship
- Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
- Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good
- Probabilities of counterfactuals and counterfactual probabilities
- Maskin monotonicity and infinite individuals
- A characterization of superdictatorial domains for strategy-proof social choice functions
- Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments
- A trade-off result for preference revelation
- Implementation via mechanisms with transfers
- The robustness of robust implementation
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Another induction proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs
- Reference-based preferences aggregation procedures in multi-criteria decision making
- Stability of social choices in infinitely large societies
- Feasible Bayesian implementation with state dependent feasible sets
- Three-valued simple games
- Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness
- Social choice and individual values in the electronic republic
- The representation of alienable and inalienable rights: Games in transition function form
- Inefficiencies on linking decisions
- Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?
- Complexity and the geometry of voting
- Approximating optimal social choice under metric preferences
- Manipulating an aggregation rule under ordinally fuzzy preferences
- On probability models in voting theory
- Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: the Pareto correspondence and a generalization
- Incentive compatibility without compensation
- A formula for incorporating weights into scoring rules
- Population monotonic and strategy-proof mechanisms respecting welfare lower bounds
- A characterization of dictatorial social choice correspondences with continuous preferences
- Strategy-proof allotment rules
- Group strategy-proofness and voting between two alternatives
- Threats, counter-threats and strategic manipulation for non-binary group decision rules
- Strategic voting under minimally binary group decision functions
- The capacity constrained facility location problem
- Independence of nonfeasible alternatives, and independence of nonoptimal alternatives
- Manipulation of social decision functions
- Manipulation of social choice rules by strategic nomination of candidates
- Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- A fundamental structure of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with restricted preferences over alternatives
- Universally beneficial manipulation: a characterization
- The existence of equilibrium in incomplete markets and the objective function of the firm
- Top-pair and top-triple monotonicity
- The Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem: A simple proof
- On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
- Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain
- The taxation principle and multi-time Hamilton-Jacobi equations
- Decomposing random mechanisms
- Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
- Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures
- Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour
- Manipulation and the Pareto rule
- Stable voting schemes
- Asymptotic efficiency of the demand revealing mechanism
- Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents
- Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods
- Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods
- Complexity of safe strategic voting
- Social choice correspondences with infinitely many agents: serial dictatorship
- How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election?
- Natural games
- Non-manipulable partitioning
- On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
- Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control
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