Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result

Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)

New problems in the general choice theory
On anonymous and weighted voting systems
Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy
The anarchy of scheduling without money
Reaching consensus: solidarity and strategic properties in binary social choice
Peter J. Hammond
Social choice rules implemented in dominant strategies
On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences
Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters
Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities
Social choice and cooperative game theory: voting games as social aggregation functions
Strategy-proofness of scoring allocation correspondences for indivisible goods
An interview with Michael Dummett: From analytical philosophy to voting analysis and beyond
Self-consistency of decision rules for group decision making
On single-peaked domains and min-max rules
Strategic voting and nomination
Distortion of preferences, income distribution, and the case for a linear income tax
Discrete Mathematics in Voting and Group Choice
Nash Q-learning agents in Hotelling's model: reestablishing equilibrium
Restricted domains, Arrow social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private and public alternatives
Expert advice to a voting body
Common agency with informed principals: menus \textit{and} signals
Symmetry and impartial lotteries
Spatial implementation
Characterizations of strategy-proof mechanisms for excludable versus nonexcludable public projects
Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability
Social choice trade-off results for conditions on triples of alternatives
Manipulation of the Pareto semi-optimal rule
Impossibility theorems are modified and unified
The informational basis of scoring rules
Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on the cobb-Douglas domain of exchange economies
Symmetry, voting, and social choice
Existence of stable situations, restricted preferences, and strategic manipulation under democratic group decision rules
Strategic behaviour and a notion of ex ante efficiency in a voting model
Collective rationality and strategy-proofness of group decision rules
A condition for Nash-stability under binary and democratic group decision functions
Recovering non-monotonicity problems of voting rules
Strategy-proof estimators for simple regression.
Decomposable effectivity functions
Strategy-proofness of the randomized Condorcet voting system
Distance restricted manipulation in voting
A note on allocations attainable through Nash equilibria
The nonmanipulative vote-deficits of voting rules
A topological approach to the Arrow impossibility theorem when individual preferences are weak orders
A topological proof of Eliaz's unified theorem of social choice theory
Voting Procedures, Complexity of
Incentive compatibility and informational requirements
Power structure and cardinality restrictions for Paretian social choice rules
Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation
Strategic equilibria and decisive set structures for social choice mechanisms
Auction design with costly preference elicitation
Representations of simple games by social choice functions
A new perspective on implementation by voting trees
Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences
Manipulation under majority decision-making when no majority suffers and preferences are strict
Strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in economies with pure public goods.
Strategy-proof coalition formation
A social choice theory of legitimacy
How to choose a non-controversial list with \(k\) names
Researching with whom? Stability and manipulation
Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
Locally robust implementation and its limits
Another direct proof for the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
Restricted domains, Arrow-social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private alternatives
Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities
A method for eliciting utilities and its application to collective choice
Disjunctive merging: quota and Gmin merging operators
Consensus rules for committee elections
Double deception: Two against one in three-person games
Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case
Implementation in generalized matching problems
On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness
Deterministic mechanisms and the revelation principle
Decision-making in organizations: when to delegate and whom to delegate
Characterizing referenda with quorums via strategy-proofness
Two-person game forms guaranteeing the stability against commitment and delaying tactics
The geometry of Black's single peakedness and related conditions
Choice Functions on Tree Quasi-Orders
Voting under constraints
Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule
Economic juries and public project provision
Monotone strategyproofness
On the manipulation of social choice correspondences
On the alternating use of ``unanimity and ``surjectivity in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
Children crying at birthday parties. Why?
Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness
Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good
Probabilities of counterfactuals and counterfactual probabilities
Maskin monotonicity and infinite individuals
A characterization of superdictatorial domains for strategy-proof social choice functions
Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments
A trade-off result for preference revelation
Implementation via mechanisms with transfers
The robustness of robust implementation
Title not available (Why is that?)
Another induction proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs

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