Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result

Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)

Studies in Computational Aspects of Voting
Strategy-proofness on restricted separable domains
Social choice theory in HOL. Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite
The impact of voters' preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes
An alternative proof of Fishburn's axiomatization of lexicographic preferences
Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights
Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains
The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models
A control-theoretic view on incentives
Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped
A note on the incompatibility of strategy-proofness and Pareto-optimality in quasi-linear settings with public budgets
Gerrymander-proof representative democracies
Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
Tops-only domains
Egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms in the allocation of heterogeneous objects
Externalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights
Efficient compromising
Mechanism design with model specification
Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains
On strategy-proof social choice correspondences
Mechanism design by observant and informed planners
Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model
A unifying impossibility theorem
Manipulability of choice aggregations
Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
Manipulation of social choice functions
Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures
Incentive compatibility and incomplete information
The complexity of priced control in elections
Control of Condorcet voting: complexity and a relation-algebraic approach
Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
Non-bossiness
Consistency in house allocation problems
Complexity of and algorithms for the manipulation of Borda, Nanson's and Baldwin's voting rules
Manipulation can be hard in tractable voting systems even for constant-sized coalitions
Coalitional strategy-proofness in economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object
On the equivalence of the Arrow impossibility theorem and the Brouwer fixed point theorem when individual preferences are weak orders
Efficient assignment with interdependent values
Incompleteness and incomparability in preference aggregation: complexity results
Picking the winners
House allocation with existing tenants
Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness
On the generic impossibility of truthful behavior: A simple approach
On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules
Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
Mechanism design
Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation
Dichotomy for voting systems
Complexity of manipulation and bribery in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules
On the complexity of bribery and manipulation in tournaments with uncertain information
Is computational complexity a barrier to manipulation?
Scheduling without payments
Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
Manipulation of voting schemes with restricted beliefs
Ordinally Bayesian incentive compatible probabilistic voting rules
The scholarship assignment problem
Strategy-proofness and ``median voters
On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition
Impediments to universal preference-based default theories
Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules
Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: A unified approach
Computational Aspects of Approval Voting
The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium
Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
Implementing efficient, anonymous and neutral social choice functions
Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions
Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
Implementation via backward induction
Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
Social preferences for the evaluation of procedures
A lemons market? An incentive scheme to induce truth-telling in third party logistics providers
Bayesian incentive compatible parametrization of mechanisms
How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election
Consequences of reversing preferences
Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
Between liberalism and democracy.
A new approach to the implementation problem
The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems
Strategy-proof risk sharing
Judge: Don't vote!
Bounded response and the equivalence of nonmanipulability and independence of irrelevant alternatives
A quest for fundamental theorems of social choice
A note on the complexity of manipulating weighted Schulze voting
On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences
Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules
Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations
On the approximability of Dodgson and Young elections
On the equivalence of the Arrow impossibility theorem and the Brouwer fixed point theorem
Defense coordination in security games: equilibrium analysis and mechanism design
Bribery in voting with CP-nets
Challenges to complexity shields that are supposed to protect elections against manipulation and control: a survey
A yardstick competition approach to a multi-firm regulation problem under asymmetric information
New problems in the general choice theory
On anonymous and weighted voting systems
Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy
The anarchy of scheduling without money
Reaching consensus: solidarity and strategic properties in binary social choice

This page was built for publication: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4090165)