Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result

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Strategic candidacy, monotonicity, and strategy-proofness
A quantitative Arrow theorem
Monotonicity, implementation and generalized strategy-proofness
Superdictatorial domains for monotonic social choice functions
Population monotonic and strategy-proof mechanisms respecting welfare lower bounds
Fuzzy social choice: a selective retrospect
A yardstick competition approach to a multi-firm regulation problem under asymmetric information
New problems in the general choice theory
Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice
Strong activity rules for iterative combinatorial auctions
Non-cooperative implementation: A survey of recent results
Further results on dictatorial domains
On anonymous and weighted voting systems
Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
Centralized allocation in multiple markets
A characterization of dictatorial social choice correspondences with continuous preferences
Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains
Trade credit: a new mechanism to coordinate supply chain
Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research
A new perspective on implementation by voting trees
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7447732 (Why is no real title available?)
Some impossibilities of ranking in generalized tournaments
Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences
Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy
Voting
Sophisticated voting with information for two voting functions
A characterization of random min-max domains and its applications
Social Choice Theory
Strategy-proof location of public facilities
Studies in Computational Aspects of Voting
Strategy-proof allotment rules
Isotone classes of social choice functions with binary range
Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences
Manipulation under majority decision-making when no majority suffers and preferences are strict
Group strategy-proofness and voting between two alternatives
Packing under convex quadratic constraints
Two field experiments on approval voting in Germany
Autocratic mechanisms: a form of dictatorship in constrained combinatorial auctions
Strategy-proof coalition formation
A social choice theory of legitimacy
On the manipulability of the fuzzy social choice functions
Threats, counter-threats and strategic manipulation for non-binary group decision rules
Strategic voting under minimally binary group decision functions
Strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in economies with pure public goods.
Consistent representations of preferences
Freedom and voting power
Characterizing group strategy-proof rules in the object allocation problem with money
Plurality rule and Condorcet criterion over restricted domains
Packing under convex quadratic constraints
The anarchy of scheduling without money
Characterizing incentive compatible, Pareto optimal and sufficiently anonymous constrained combinatorial mechanisms -- two players case
Independence of nonfeasible alternatives, and independence of nonoptimal alternatives
The capacity constrained facility location problem
Manipulation of social decision functions
Manipulation of social choice rules by strategic nomination of candidates
Strategy-proof location of public bads in an interval
How to choose a non-controversial list with \(k\) names
A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules
On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals
Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7431114 (Why is no real title available?)
Researching with whom? Stability and manipulation
Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
Reaching consensus: solidarity and strategic properties in binary social choice
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7561332 (Why is no real title available?)
A fundamental structure of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with restricted preferences over alternatives
Universally beneficial manipulation: a characterization
Strategy-proof preference aggregation and the anonymity-neutrality tradeoff
Dominance of truthtelling and the lattice structure of Nash equilibria
On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions
Manipulation in elections with uncertain preferences
Individually Rational Strategy-Proof Social Choice with Exogenous Indifference Sets
Strategy-proofness on restricted separable domains
An axiomatic analysis of the papal conclave
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7450036 (Why is no real title available?)
Continuous selections from the Pareto correspondence and non-manipulability in exchange economies
Locally robust implementation and its limits
Another direct proof for the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
Peter J. Hammond
Self-designation and group allocation
Facility assignment with fair cost sharing: equilibrium and mechanism design
A natural adaptive process for collective decision-making
Deriving consensus in multiagent systems
Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
Restricted domains, Arrow-social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private alternatives
Group choice under fuzzy information
Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities
Social choice rules implemented in dominant strategies
The existence of equilibrium in incomplete markets and the objective function of the firm
Manipulability in a group activity selection problem
On optimal environmental taxation and envorcement: Information, monitoring and efficiency
The Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem: A simple proof
Obviously strategy-proof mechanisms without money for scheduling
On a class of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with single-peaked utility functions
Top-pair and top-triple monotonicity
On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
Implementation theory
A model of consensus and consensus building within the framework of committees with permissible ranges of decision makers
Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain
To vote or not to vote: What is the quota?

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