Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result

Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)

New problems in the general choice theory
On anonymous and weighted voting systems
Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy
The anarchy of scheduling without money
Reaching consensus: solidarity and strategic properties in binary social choice
Peter J. Hammond
Social choice rules implemented in dominant strategies
Voting procedures, complexity of
On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences
Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters
Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities
Social choice and cooperative game theory: voting games as social aggregation functions
Strategy-proofness of scoring allocation correspondences for indivisible goods
An interview with Michael Dummett: From analytical philosophy to voting analysis and beyond
Self-consistency of decision rules for group decision making
On single-peaked domains and min-max rules
Strategic voting and nomination
Distortion of preferences, income distribution, and the case for a linear income tax
Discrete Mathematics in Voting and Group Choice
Nash Q-learning agents in Hotelling's model: reestablishing equilibrium
Restricted domains, Arrow social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private and public alternatives
Expert advice to a voting body
Common agency with informed principals: menus \textit{and} signals
Symmetry and impartial lotteries
Spatial implementation
Characterizations of strategy-proof mechanisms for excludable versus nonexcludable public projects
Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability
Social choice trade-off results for conditions on triples of alternatives
Manipulation of the Pareto semi-optimal rule
Impossibility theorems are modified and unified
The informational basis of scoring rules
Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on the cobb-Douglas domain of exchange economies
Symmetry, voting, and social choice
Existence of stable situations, restricted preferences, and strategic manipulation under democratic group decision rules
Strategic behaviour and a notion of ex ante efficiency in a voting model
Collective rationality and strategy-proofness of group decision rules
A condition for Nash-stability under binary and democratic group decision functions
Recovering non-monotonicity problems of voting rules
Strategy-proof estimators for simple regression.
Decomposable effectivity functions
Strategy-proofness of the randomized Condorcet voting system
Distance restricted manipulation in voting
A note on allocations attainable through Nash equilibria
The nonmanipulative vote-deficits of voting rules
A topological approach to the Arrow impossibility theorem when individual preferences are weak orders
A topological proof of Eliaz's unified theorem of social choice theory
Incentive compatibility and informational requirements
Power structure and cardinality restrictions for Paretian social choice rules
Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation
Strategic equilibria and decisive set structures for social choice mechanisms
Auction design with costly preference elicitation
Representations of simple games by social choice functions
A new perspective on implementation by voting trees
Population monotonic and strategy-proof mechanisms respecting welfare lower bounds
A characterization of dictatorial social choice correspondences with continuous preferences
Strategy-proof allotment rules
Group strategy-proofness and voting between two alternatives
Threats, counter-threats and strategic manipulation for non-binary group decision rules
Strategic voting under minimally binary group decision functions
The capacity constrained facility location problem
Independence of nonfeasible alternatives, and independence of nonoptimal alternatives
Manipulation of social decision functions
Manipulation of social choice rules by strategic nomination of candidates
Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences
Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
A fundamental structure of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with restricted preferences over alternatives
Universally beneficial manipulation: a characterization
The existence of equilibrium in incomplete markets and the objective function of the firm
Top-pair and top-triple monotonicity
The Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem: A simple proof
On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain
The taxation principle and multi-time Hamilton-Jacobi equations
Decomposing random mechanisms
Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures
Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour
Manipulation and the Pareto rule
Stable voting schemes
Asymptotic efficiency of the demand revealing mechanism
Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents
Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods
Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods
Complexity of safe strategic voting
Social choice correspondences with infinitely many agents: serial dictatorship
How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election?
Natural games
Non-manipulable partitioning
On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control
A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
A decomposition of strategy-proofness
Single-dipped preferences with satiation: strong group strategy-proofness and unanimity
Computational complexity of manipulation: a survey
Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences
Is it ever safe to vote strategically?
Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient?
Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
Socially desirable approximations for dodgson’s voting rule
A heuristic optimization of Bayesian incentive-compatible cake-cutting

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