Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result

Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)

Population monotonic and strategy-proof mechanisms respecting welfare lower bounds
A characterization of dictatorial social choice correspondences with continuous preferences
Strategy-proof allotment rules
Group strategy-proofness and voting between two alternatives
Threats, counter-threats and strategic manipulation for non-binary group decision rules
Strategic voting under minimally binary group decision functions
The capacity constrained facility location problem
Independence of nonfeasible alternatives, and independence of nonoptimal alternatives
Manipulation of social decision functions
Manipulation of social choice rules by strategic nomination of candidates
Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences
Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
A fundamental structure of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with restricted preferences over alternatives
Universally beneficial manipulation: a characterization
The existence of equilibrium in incomplete markets and the objective function of the firm
Top-pair and top-triple monotonicity
The Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem: A simple proof
On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain
The taxation principle and multi-time Hamilton-Jacobi equations
Decomposing random mechanisms
Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures
Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour
Manipulation and the Pareto rule
Stable voting schemes
Asymptotic efficiency of the demand revealing mechanism
Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents
Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods
Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods
Complexity of safe strategic voting
Social choice correspondences with infinitely many agents: serial dictatorship
How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election?
Natural games
Non-manipulable partitioning
On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control
A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
A decomposition of strategy-proofness
Single-dipped preferences with satiation: strong group strategy-proofness and unanimity
Computational complexity of manipulation: a survey
Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences
Is it ever safe to vote strategically?
Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient?
Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
Socially desirable approximations for dodgson’s voting rule
A heuristic optimization of Bayesian incentive-compatible cake-cutting
A quantitative Gobbard-Satterthwaite theorem without neutrality
Circular domains
Social choice theory without Pareto: the pivotal voter approach
The geometry of manipulation -- a quantitative proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness
False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives
Manipulation in games with multiple levels of output
A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions
Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains
A dictatorial domain for monotone social choice functions
The structure of decision schemes with cardinal preferences
Independent social choice correspondences are dictatorial
Manipulation of nonimposed, nonoligarchic, nonbinary group decision rules
Multivalued decision rules and coalitional nonmanipulability. Two possibility theorems
Reasoning about social choice functions
Social framing effects: preferences or beliefs?
Strategy-proof partitioning
A note on a group preference axiomatization with cardinal utility
A cardinal approach to straightforward probabilistic mechanisms
Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results
Computer-aided proofs of Arrow's and other impossibility theorems
Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes
Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach
Rights exercising and a Pareto-consistent libertarian claim
On the role of language in social choice theory
Normalized range voting broadly resists control
On ring formation in auctions
Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted
Implementation in differential information economies
Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
Limited resoluteness and strategic voting: The case of linear sincere preference orderings
Strategic candidacy, monotonicity, and strategy-proofness
A quantitative Arrow theorem
Monotonicity, implementation and generalized strategy-proofness
Superdictatorial domains for monotonic social choice functions
Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences
Manipulation under majority decision-making when no majority suffers and preferences are strict
Strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in economies with pure public goods.
Strategy-proof coalition formation
A social choice theory of legitimacy
How to choose a non-controversial list with \(k\) names
Researching with whom? Stability and manipulation
Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
Locally robust implementation and its limits
Another direct proof for the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
Restricted domains, Arrow-social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private alternatives
Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities
A method for eliciting utilities and its application to collective choice
Disjunctive merging: quota and Gmin merging operators
Consensus rules for committee elections
Double deception: Two against one in three-person games
Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case

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