Strategy-proofness on restricted separable domains
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Publication:483577
DOI10.1007/s10058-013-0149-7zbMath1302.91085OpenAlexW2013824052MaRDI QIDQ483577
Bernardo Moreno, Ricardo Martínez
Publication date: 17 December 2014
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-013-0149-7
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