Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
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Publication:4530944
DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00038zbMATH Open1022.91020OpenAlexW2032206498MaRDI QIDQ4530944FDOQ4530944
Authors: Michel Le Breton, Arunava Sen 
Publication date: 28 May 2002
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00038
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- Implementing direct democracy via representation
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- Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research
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- Strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in economies with pure public goods.
- Strategic Abstention based on Preference Extensions: Positive Results and Computer-Generated Impossibilities
- Strategy-proof coalition formation
- Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences
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- Strategy-proofness on restricted separable domains
- On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
- A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains
- Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences
- Collective Choice for Simple Preferences
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- Coalition-proof Nash allocation in a barter game with multiple indivisible goods
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- On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
- Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers
- The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules
- John A. Weymark
- Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods
- Voting by committees under constraints
- An indistinguishability result on rationalizability under general preferences
- min, max, and sum
- Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods.
- The uniform rule with several commodities: a generalization of Sprumont's characterization
- Formation of committees through random voting rules
- Committee formation under constraints through randomized voting rules on separable domains
- Spatial implementation
- Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains
- A decomposition of strategy-proofness
- A characterization of possibility domains under Pareto optimality and group strategy-proofness
- Sequential composition of voting rules in multi-issue domains
- Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources
- Immunity to credible deviations from the truth
- The decomposition of strategy-proof random social choice functions on dichotomous domains
- On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions
- Strategy-proof choice with monotonic additive preferences
- Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness
- Separable discrete preferences
- Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure
- Inefficiencies on linking decisions
- On the operation of multiple matching markets
- Matching with partners and projects
- Strategy-proof partitioning
- The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domains and lexicographically separable preferences
- On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods
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