Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability

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The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domains and lexicographically separable preferences
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Cited in

(55)

Centralized allocation in multiple markets
On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods
Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research
Random assignments of bundles
Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange
Social Choice Theory
Strategy-proof coalition formation
Strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in economies with pure public goods.
Strategic Abstention based on Preference Extensions: Positive Results and Computer-Generated Impossibilities
Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences
Implementation in partial equilibrium
Strategy-proofness on restricted separable domains
On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains
Implementing direct democracy via representation
Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences
Collective Choice for Simple Preferences
On strategy-proof social choice under categorization
Random dictatorship domains
Coalition-proof Nash allocation in a barter game with multiple indivisible goods
A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
Tops-only domains
On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers
John A. Weymark
Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods
Voting by committees under constraints
The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules
An indistinguishability result on rationalizability under general preferences
min, max, and sum
Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods.
The uniform rule with several commodities: a generalization of Sprumont's characterization
Group strategy-proof rules in multidimensional binary domains
Formation of committees through random voting rules
Spatial implementation
A decomposition of strategy-proofness
Committee formation under constraints through randomized voting rules on separable domains
Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains
A characterization of possibility domains under Pareto optimality and group strategy-proofness
Sequential composition of voting rules in multi-issue domains
Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources
Immunity to credible deviations from the truth
The decomposition of strategy-proof random social choice functions on dichotomous domains
Strategy-proof choice with monotonic additive preferences
On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions
Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel
Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness
Separable discrete preferences
Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure
Inefficiencies on linking decisions
On the operation of multiple matching markets
Matching with partners and projects
Strategy-proof partitioning
The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domains and lexicographically separable preferences

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