A decomposition of strategy-proofness
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Publication:331707
DOI10.1007/S00355-016-0959-YzbMATH Open1392.91064OpenAlexW2317897940MaRDI QIDQ331707FDOQ331707
Authors: Nozomu Muto, Shin Sato 
Publication date: 27 October 2016
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0959-y
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individual bounded responsestrategy-proofness decompositiontop-restricted AM-proofnessweak monotonicity
Cites Work
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- Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules
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- Bounded response of aggregated preferences
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
- Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient?
- Circular domains
Cited In (8)
- A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules
- Decomposing random mechanisms
- Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
- On completeness of narrowing strategies
- An impossibility under bounded response of social choice functions
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
- Strategy-proofness of continuous aggregation maps
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