Bounded response and the equivalence of nonmanipulability and independence of irrelevant alternatives
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Publication:2340271
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44383 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3405712 (Why is no real title available?)
- A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
- Essential aggregation procedures on restricted domains of preferences
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Preference Proximity and Anonymous Social Choice
- Strategy-proof preference aggregation: possibilities and characterizations
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategy-proofness of social welfare functions: The use of the Kemeny distance between preference orderings
Cited in
(6)- Strategyproof and efficient preference aggregation with Kemeny-based criteria
- Comparing preference orders: asymptotic independence
- Strategy-proof preference aggregation: possibilities and characterizations
- Bounded response of aggregated preferences
- A decomposition of strategy-proofness
- Metrizable preferences over preferences
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