Bounded response and the equivalence of nonmanipulability and independence of irrelevant alternatives
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Publication:2340271
DOI10.1007/s00355-014-0825-8zbMath1314.91107OpenAlexW2040221500MaRDI QIDQ2340271
Publication date: 16 April 2015
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0825-8
Related Items
Bounded response of aggregated preferences, Comparing preference orders: asymptotic independence, A decomposition of strategy-proofness, Strategy-proof preference aggregation: possibilities and characterizations, Metrizable preferences over preferences, Strategyproof and efficient preference aggregation with Kemeny-based criteria
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