Comparing preference orders: asymptotic independence
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Publication:2634476
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3256930 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3405712 (Why is no real title available?)
- A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
- Bounded response and the equivalence of nonmanipulability and independence of irrelevant alternatives
- Eliciting welfare preferences from behavioural data sets
- Majority voting on orders
- Preference extension rules for ranking sets of alternatives with a fixed cardinality
- Strategy-proof preference aggregation: possibilities and characterizations
- Strategy-proofness and the reluctance to make large lies: the case of weak orders
- Strategy-proofness of social welfare functions: The use of the Kemeny distance between preference orderings
- Weighted distances between preferences
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