Comparing preference orders: asymptotic independence
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Publication:2634476
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2015.10.005zbMATH Open1347.91132OpenAlexW2129281635MaRDI QIDQ2634476FDOQ2634476
Publication date: 9 February 2016
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/26653/070econDP14-06.pdf
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