Strategy-proof preference aggregation: possibilities and characterizations
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Publication:2442846
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Cites work
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Cited in
(35)- Strategy-proofness of continuous aggregation maps
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1081145 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1143643 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1986063 (Why is no real title available?)
- Weakly unimodal domains, anti-exchange properties, and coalitional strategy-proofness of aggregation rules
- Strategic Abstention based on Preference Extensions: Positive Results and Computer-Generated Impossibilities
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- Bivariate scoring rules: unifying the characterizations of positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule
- Minimally strategy-proof rank aggregation
- Strategy-proof preference aggregation and the anonymity-neutrality tradeoff
- Rank aggregation using scoring rules
- A characterization of status quo rules in the binary social choice model
- Solidarity for public goods under single-peaked preferences: characterizing target set correspondences
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