Weakly unimodal domains, anti-exchange properties, and coalitional strategy-proofness of aggregation rules

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2016.08.004zbMATH Open1397.91195OpenAlexW2518758954MaRDI QIDQ502367FDOQ502367

Authors: Stefano Vannucci 

Publication date: 5 January 2017

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11365/1005690

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zbMATH Keywords

aggregation rulesanti-exchange propertiescoalitional strategy-proofnessunimodal domains

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

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Cited In (4)

• Strategy-proof aggregation rules and single peakedness in bounded distributive lattices
• Single peaked domains with tree-shaped spectra
• Majority judgment and strategy-proofness: a characterization
• Preferences in abstract convex structures

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