Weakly unimodal domains, anti-exchange properties, and coalitional strategy-proofness of aggregation rules

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.08.004zbMath1397.91195OpenAlexW2518758954MaRDI QIDQ502367

Stefano Vannucci

Publication date: 5 January 2017

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11365/1005690

zbMATH Keywords

aggregation rulesanti-exchange propertiescoalitional strategy-proofnessunimodal domains

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

Strategy-proof aggregation rules and single peakedness in bounded distributive lattices ⋮ Preferences in Abstract Convex Structures ⋮ Single peaked domains with tree-shaped spectra ⋮ Majority judgment and strategy-proofness: a characterization

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