Weakly unimodal domains, anti-exchange properties, and coalitional strategy-proofness of aggregation rules

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2016.08.004MaRDI QIDQ502367zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Stefano Vannucci

Publication date 5 January 2017

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/11365/1005690

zbMATH Keywords

aggregation rulesanti-exchange propertiescoalitional strategy-proofnessunimodal domains

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 439012 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4079106 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1142756 (Why is no real title available?)
• Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
• Generalized median voter schemes and committees
• Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
• Media theory. Interdisciplinary applied mathematics.
• Medians and Betweenness
• Medians in median graphs
• On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
• Pareto optimality, anonymity, and strategy-proofness in location problems
• Single-peakedness and strategy-proofness of generalized median voter schemes
• Strategy-proof location on a network
• Strategy-proof preference aggregation: possibilities and characterizations
• The structure of non-manipulable social choice rules on a tree
• The structure of strategy-proof social choice. I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces
• Trees, Lattices, Order, and Betweenness

Cited in

(4)

• Preferences in abstract convex structures
• Strategy-proof aggregation rules and single peakedness in bounded distributive lattices
• Single peaked domains with tree-shaped spectra
• Majority judgment and strategy-proofness: a characterization

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