The structure of strategy-proof social choice. I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 439012 (Why is no real title available?)
- Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- Median algebras
- Single-peaked orders on a tree
- Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
- Voting by Committees
- Voting under constraints
Cited in
(93)- Monotonic norms and orthogonal issues in multidimensional voting
- Preferences in abstract convex structures
- Preference reversal and strategy-proofness with more than three alternatives
- Majority rule in the absence of a majority
- Social Choice Theory
- The Condorcet set: majority voting over interconnected propositions
- Unanimity in attribute-based preference domains
- Neutrality and relative acceptability in judgment aggregation
- Convex preferences: an abstract approach
- The capacity constrained facility location problem
- The theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory review
- A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules
- On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals
- Truth-tracking judgment aggregation over interconnected issues
- Incoherent majorities: the McGarvey problem in judgement aggregation
- Aggregating individual credences into collective binary beliefs: an impossibility result
- Maximal Condorcet domains. A further progress report
- Strategy-proof aggregation rules and single peakedness in bounded distributive lattices
- The complexity landscape of outcome determination in judgment aggregation
- A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains
- Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. I: General agendas
- Methods for distance-based judgment aggregation
- Consistent rights on property spaces
- Geometric models of consistent judgement aggregation
- On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
- The single-peaked domain revisited: a simple global characterization
- Recognizing single-peaked preferences on an arbitrary graph: complexity and algorithms
- Abstract Arrowian aggregation
- Justifiable group choice
- Ontology Merging as Social Choice
- Introduction to judgment aggregation
- Judgment aggregation in search for the truth
- Strategy-proof preference aggregation: possibilities and characterizations
- Tops-only domains
- Single-peakedness and strategy-proofness of generalized median voter schemes
- On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness
- Efficient and strategy-proof voting over connected coalitions: a possibility result
- Approximation randomized strategy-proof mechanisms in obnoxious facility game with weighted agents
- Majority rule for profiles of arbitrary length, with an emphasis on the consistency axiom
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for pairwise majority decisions on path-connected domains
- On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
- On the computational complexity of non-dictatorial aggregation
- Preference as fulfilment of desires
- A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model
- Single peaked domains with tree-shaped spectra
- Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains
- The median rule in judgement aggregation
- Judgement aggregation in non-classical logics
- Lifting integrity constraints in binary aggregation
- Undominated rules with three alternatives in an almost unrestricted domain
- On single-peaked domains and min-max rules
- Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
- Monotone strategyproofness
- Random subcube intersection graphs. I: Cliques and covering
- Probabilistic fixed ballot rules and hybrid domains
- Strategy-proofness, Pareto optimality and strictly convex norms
- Fair representation and a linear Shapley rule
- On the implementation of the median
- Condorcet domains, median graphs and the single-crossing property
- Single-crossing, strategic voting and the median choice rule
- Community standards
- Between Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite. A representation theoretic approach
- Spatial implementation
- Local supermajorities
- Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains
- A characterization of the single-peaked domain
- Structure of single-peaked preferences
- Condorcet winners on median spaces
- Strategyproof judgment aggregation under partial information
- Collective argumentation: the case of aggregating support-relations of bipolar argumentation frameworks
- On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions
- Top monotonicity: a common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result
- Solidarity in preference aggregation: improving on a status quo
- Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel
- Majority judgment and strategy-proofness: a characterization
- Preference restrictions for simple and strategy-proof rules: local and weakly single-peaked domains
- Consistent judgement aggregation: the truth-functional case
- Parameterized complexity classes beyond para-NP
- Weakly unimodal domains, anti-exchange properties, and coalitional strategy-proofness of aggregation rules
- When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free?
- Measuring nearly single-peakedness of an electorate: some new insights
- Dictatorship versus manipulability
- Strategy-proof interval-social choice correspondences over extended single-peaked domains
- On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness
- Strategy-proof partitioning
- Nonmanipulability in two dimensions
- Unanimous and strategy-proof probabilistic rules for single-peaked preference profiles on graphs
- Quota rules for incomplete judgments
- Aggregating Credences into Beliefs: Agenda Conditions for Impossibility Results
- New characterizations of strategy-proofness under single-peakedness
- Stable outcomes in simple cooperative games
- Structured preferences: a literature survey
- Strategy-proof budgeting via a VCG-like mechanism
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