The structure of strategy-proof social choice. I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces
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Publication:996379
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.04.008zbMath1186.91092OpenAlexW2165733306MaRDI QIDQ996379
Klaus Nehring, Clemens D. Puppe
Publication date: 14 September 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.04.008
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