Between Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite. A representation theoretic approach
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Publication:466073
DOI10.1007/s11856-014-1064-5zbMath1302.91081arXiv1203.3368OpenAlexW2963598304MaRDI QIDQ466073
Publication date: 24 October 2014
Published in: Israel Journal of Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1203.3368
Related Items (2)
Probabilistic view of voting, paradoxes, and manipulation ⋮ A structure theorem for almost low-degree functions on the slice
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