Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(75)90050-2zbMath0315.90088WikidataQ55868063 ScholiaQ55868063MaRDI QIDQ1221568

Publication date: 1975

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/122.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B06: Decision theory

91B12: Voting theory

91B14: Social choice

91A35: Decision theory for games

91D99: Mathematical sociology (including anthropology)

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