Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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Publication:1221568
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- A quantitative Arrow theorem
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- Individual preferences, government policy, and COVID-19: a game-theoretic epidemiological analysis
- An alternative proof of Fishburn's axiomatization of lexicographic preferences
- Consensus rules for committee elections
- Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation
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