Generalized assignment problem: truthful mechanism design without money

DOI10.1016/j.orl.2016.12.003zbMath1409.91118arXiv1608.04273OpenAlexW2516120895MaRDI QIDQ1727952

Martin Bichler, Salman Fadaei

Publication date: 21 February 2019

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1608.04273

zbMATH Keywords

generalized assignment problemapproximationtruthfulnessmechanism design without money

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

Truthfulness in advertising? Approximation mechanisms for knapsack bidders ⋮ Electronic service matching: failure of incentive compatibility in vickrey auctions ⋮ Generalized assignment problem: truthful mechanism design without money ⋮ A branching algorithm to solve binary problem in uncertain environment: an application in machine allocation problem

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• An approximation algorithm for the generalized assignment problem
• Generalized assignment problem: truthful mechanism design without money
• Truthfulness and Approximation with Value-Maximizing Bidders
• On the Approximability of Budgeted Allocations and Improved Lower Bounds for Submodular Welfare Maximization and GAP
• Randomized metarounding (extended abstract)
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Truthful Generalized Assignments via Stable Matching

This page was built for publication: Generalized assignment problem: truthful mechanism design without money