Truthfulness and Approximation with Value-Maximizing Bidders
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Publication:2819462
DOI10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3_19zbMath1403.91168arXiv1607.03821OpenAlexW2513467092MaRDI QIDQ2819462
Publication date: 29 September 2016
Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1607.03821
Related Items (3)
Truthfulness in advertising? Approximation mechanisms for knapsack bidders ⋮ Generalized assignment problem: truthful mechanism design without money ⋮ Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: on the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets
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