Truthfulness and Approximation with Value-Maximizing Bidders

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3_19zbMath1403.91168arXiv1607.03821OpenAlexW2513467092MaRDI QIDQ2819462

Martin Bichler, Salman Fadaei

Publication date: 29 September 2016

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1607.03821

zbMATH Keywords

truthfulnessrevenueapproximation mechanismsvalue bidders

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Truthfulness in advertising? Approximation mechanisms for knapsack bidders ⋮ Generalized assignment problem: truthful mechanism design without money ⋮ Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: on the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets

Cites Work

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• Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
• A Truthful Mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Scheduling
• Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions

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