Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3455542
DOI10.1145/585265.585266zbMath1326.91011OpenAlexW2062830639MaRDI QIDQ3455542
Yoav Shoham, Liadan O'Callaghan, Daniel J. Lehmann
Publication date: 7 December 2015
Published in: Journal of the ACM (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/585265.585266
Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Approximation methods and heuristics in mathematical programming (90C59) Combinatorial optimization (90C27) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (76)
Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values ⋮ Characterizing incentive compatible, Pareto optimal and sufficiently anonymous constrained combinatorial mechanisms – Two players case ⋮ Single-Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations ⋮ Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions ⋮ Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions ⋮ Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity ⋮ Welfare Maximization with Deferred Acceptance Auctions in Reallocation Problems ⋮ Combinatorial Walrasian Equilibrium ⋮ Multilateral Deferred-Acceptance Mechanisms ⋮ Two-way greedy: algorithms for imperfect rationality ⋮ Setting lower bounds on truthfulness ⋮ Separating the Communication Complexity of Truthful and Nontruthful Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions ⋮ Distributed fair allocation of indivisible goods ⋮ Approximate composable truthful mechanism design ⋮ Approximate Truthful Mechanism Design for Two-Dimensional Orthogonal Knapsack Problem ⋮ Approximation guarantee of OSP mechanisms: the case of machine scheduling and facility location ⋮ Cost sharing and strategyproof mechanisms for set cover games ⋮ Quality of local equilibria in discrete exchange economies ⋮ Mechanism design for land acquisition ⋮ Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting ⋮ Budget-balanced and strategy-proof auctions for ridesharing ⋮ On improved interval cover mechanisms for crowdsourcing markets ⋮ Spectrum Bidding in Wireless Networks and Related ⋮ Inapproximability of Truthful Mechanisms via Generalizations of the Vapnik--Chervonenkis Dimension ⋮ Optimal shill bidding in the VCG mechanism ⋮ A survey of approximability and inapproximability results for social welfare optimization in multiagent resource allocation ⋮ Incentive compatible regression learning ⋮ Strategyproof auction mechanisms for network procurement ⋮ Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions ⋮ Bounding the payment of approximate truthful mechanisms ⋮ Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms ⋮ Computationally-feasible truthful auctions for convex bundles ⋮ Combinatorial auctions without money ⋮ Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity ⋮ Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: on the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets ⋮ Truthful mechanism design via correlated tree rounding ⋮ Equilibria of Greedy Combinatorial Auctions ⋮ Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions ⋮ On complexity of single-minded auction ⋮ Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders ⋮ The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices ⋮ When Analysis Fails: Heuristic Mechanism Design via Self-correcting Procedures ⋮ A combinatorial double auction resource allocation model in cloud computing ⋮ Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities ⋮ Side constraints and non-price attributes in markets ⋮ Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions ⋮ Automated Design of Revenue-Maximizing Combinatorial Auctions ⋮ On envy-free revenue approximation for combinatorial buyers with budgets ⋮ A PAC Approach to Application-Specific Algorithm Selection ⋮ Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable ⋮ Towards characterizing the deterministic combinatorial constrained efficient space ⋮ Introduction to the special issue -- Algorithmic game theory -- STOC/FOCS/SODA 2011 ⋮ Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings ⋮ Preemptive Scheduling on Selfish Machines ⋮ On the Approximability of Combinatorial Exchange Problems ⋮ Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design and Algebraic Communication Complexity ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions ⋮ Truthfulness and Approximation with Value-Maximizing Bidders ⋮ Envy-Free Revenue Approximation for Asymmetric Buyers with Budgets ⋮ GreedEx---a scalable clearing mechanism for utility computing ⋮ Dynamic communication mechanism design ⋮ On social envy-freeness in multi-unit markets ⋮ A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements ⋮ Mechanism design for set cover games with selfish element agents ⋮ Priority algorithms for graph optimization problems ⋮ Market-based pricing in grids: on strategic manipulation and computational cost ⋮ Combinatorial auctions for electronic business ⋮ Fair by design: multidimensional envy-free mechanisms ⋮ Incentive compatible mulit-unit combinatorial auctions: a primal dual approach ⋮ Dictatorial Mechanisms in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions ⋮ Characterizing the incentive compatible and Pareto optimal efficiency space for two players, \(k\) items, public budget and quasilinear utilities ⋮ Revenue maximization with a single sample ⋮ The incompatibility of Pareto optimality and dominant-strategy incentive compatibility in sufficiently-anonymous budget-constrained quasilinear settings ⋮ Iterative Dutch combinatorial auctions ⋮ Auction design with costly preference elicitation
This page was built for publication: Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
