Combinatorial auctions without money
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Publication:521808
DOI10.1007/s00453-015-0105-8zbMath1411.91254arXiv1310.0177OpenAlexW3138967961MaRDI QIDQ521808
Carmine Ventre, Dimitris Fotakis, Piotr Krysta
Publication date: 12 April 2017
Published in: Algorithmica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1310.0177
algorithmic mechanism designapproximate mechanism design without moneycombinatorial auctionsmechanisms with verification
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