Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions
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Publication:2519488
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.12.009zbMath1152.91472OpenAlexW2041211404MaRDI QIDQ2519488
Publication date: 26 January 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/13158/
approximation algorithmsmulti-unit auctionsmechanism designcombinatorial auctionsmulti-unit combinatorial auctions
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Combinatorial games (91A46)
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Uses Software
Cites Work
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