The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
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Publication:2496786
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2004.10.007zbMATH Open1132.91531OpenAlexW2161272173MaRDI QIDQ2496786FDOQ2496786
Authors: Noam Nisan, I. R. Segal' 
Publication date: 20 July 2006
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.10.007
Recommendations
approximationcommunication complexitycombinatorial auctionspreference elicitationdistributional complexitysubstitutable itemsmessage space dimensionhomogeneous itemsinformational efficiency of pricessubmodular valuations
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Cited In (50)
- Communication complexity of discrete fair division
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- Market pricing for matroid rank valuations
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