Communication and efficiency in auctions

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.10.002MaRDI QIDQ417694zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Nenad Kos

Publication date 14 May 2012

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.10.002

zbMATH Keywords

communication complexitymechanism designmessage space

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5547873 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3215724 (Why is no real title available?)
• Coarse Matching
• Efficient and Competitive Rationing
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• On the role of discrete bid levels in oral auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
• Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
• The communication cost of selfishness

Cited in

(12)

• The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
• The communication complexity of private value single-item auctions
• Nonlinear pricing with finite information
• Asymptotically optimal communication in simple mechanisms
• Dynamic communication mechanism design
• Auctioning bulk mobile messages
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5547873 (Why is no real title available?)
• Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case
• Mechanism design with a restricted action space
• Asking questions
• To reveal or not to reveal: privacy preferences and economic frictions
• The choice of the number of varieties: justifying simple mechanisms

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