Communication and efficiency in auctions
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Publication:417694
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.10.002zbMATH Open1279.91086OpenAlexW2093733100MaRDI QIDQ417694FDOQ417694
Authors: Nenad Kos 
Publication date: 14 May 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.10.002
Recommendations
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)
Cites Work
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Optimal Auction Design
- Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
- Information structures in optimal auctions
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- On the role of discrete bid levels in oral auctions
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Efficient and Competitive Rationing
- Coarse Matching
- The communication cost of selfishness
- Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
Cited In (12)
- Asymptotically optimal communication in simple mechanisms
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Auctioning bulk mobile messages
- To reveal or not to reveal: privacy preferences and economic frictions
- The choice of the number of varieties: justifying simple mechanisms
- The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
- Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case
- Mechanism design with a restricted action space
- Nonlinear pricing with finite information
- The communication complexity of private value single-item auctions
- Asking questions
- Dynamic communication mechanism design
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