Mechanism design with a restricted action space

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.03.005MaRDI QIDQ2437830zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Liad Blumrosen, Michal Feldman

Publication date 13 March 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.005

zbMATH Keywords

communication complexityexpressivenessimplementationmechanism designmessage space

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms
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Cited in

(9)

• To reveal or not to reveal: privacy preferences and economic frictions
• Truth-tracking judgment aggregation over interconnected issues
• Optimal mechanisms with finite agent types
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5343725 (Why is no real title available?)
• Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1341045 (Why is no real title available?)
• Coarse matching with incomplete information
• Sketching valuation functions
• Mechanism design and bounded rationality: the case of type misreporting

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