Coarse matching with incomplete information
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Publication:535167
DOI10.1007/s00199-009-0514-5zbMath1227.91029OpenAlexW3121167566MaRDI QIDQ535167
Emre Ozdenoren, Benny Moldovanu, Heidrun C. Hoppe
Publication date: 11 May 2011
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0514-5
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)
Related Items (12)
Regular type distributions in mechanism design and \(\rho\)-concavity ⋮ Nonlinear pricing with finite information ⋮ Matching strategic agents on a two-sided platform ⋮ Tailored recommendations on a matching platform ⋮ Assortative matching by lottery contests ⋮ All-pay matching contests ⋮ Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes ⋮ What money can't buy: efficient mechanism design with costly signals ⋮ Matching through position auctions ⋮ Codes of best practice in competitive markets for managers ⋮ Coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts ⋮ Monopolistic Signal Provision
Cites Work
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- Price discrimination and efficient matching
- Monopoly and product quality
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- Monopolistic Signal Provision
- The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals
- Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
- Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
- Efficient and Competitive Rationing
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal Nonlinear Pricing and Contingent Contracts
- Coarse Matching
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