Two-sided matching with interdependent values
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4207454 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- Agreeing to disagree
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Comparative statics in matching markets
- Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Matching with noise and the acceptance curse
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
- Posterior efficiency
- Stable matchings and rematching-proof equilibria in a two-sided matching market
- The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals
- Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
Cited in
(30)- Market Design
- Self-selection in school choice
- An assignment problem with interdependent valuations and externalities
- Group stability in matching with interdependent values
- Group robust stability in matching markets
- On the non-existence of stable matches with incomplete information
- Lazy Gale-Shapley for many-to-one matching with partial information
- Reputation, learning and project choice in frictional economies
- The marriage problem with interdependent preferences
- Not all is lost: sorting and self-stabilizing sets
- Stable matching with incomplete information
- Decision-making with reference information
- Incentive compatibility and feasibility constraints in housing markets
- Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning
- On non‐bossy matching rules in two‐sided matching problems
- Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values
- On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching
- Designing information to improve welfare in matching markets
- Matching markets under (in)complete information
- A dynamic school choice model
- Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty
- Disclosure of information in matching markets with non-transferable utility
- Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching
- Assignment mechanisms: common preferences and information acquisition
- Bayesian stable states
- Coarse matching with incomplete information
- Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
- Stability with one-sided incomplete information
- Efficient assignment with interdependent values
- The role of common and private signals in two-sided matching with interviews
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