Comparative statics in matching markets
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Publication:1176684
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(91)90129-RzbMath0738.90017OpenAlexW2066122187MaRDI QIDQ1176684
Publication date: 25 June 1992
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90129-r
Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.) (05C70) Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Labor markets (91B39)
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Cites Work
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- The assignment game. I: The core
- Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
- The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
- Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions
- The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
