Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs.
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The authors introduce the parametrized collections of games with and without sidepayments and provide three nonemptiness of approximate core theorems. These results are applied to a new model of an economy with clubs. Their approach allows both widespread externalities and uniform results.
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- An Exact Bound on Epsilon for Nonemptiness of Epsilon Cores of Games
Cites work
- A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
- A Reformulation of the Marginal Productivity Theory of Distribution
- An Elementary Core Equivalence Theorem
- An Exact Bound on Epsilon for Nonemptiness of Epsilon Cores of Games
- Approximate Cores of Large Games
- Approximate cores of replica games and economies. I: Replica games, externalities, and approximate cores
- Bargaining, coalitions and competition
- Comparative statics in matching markets
- Continuity Properties of the Core of a Market
- Continuum economies with finite coalitions: Core, equilibria, and widespread externalities
- Convergence theorems on the core of a public goods economy: Sufficient conditions
- Core convergence without monotone preferences and free disposal
- Core equivalence with congested public goods
- Cores and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities and lotteries
- Cores of partitioning games
- Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods
- Epsilon cores of games with limited side payments nonemptiness and equal treatment
- Equilibria, the core, and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good
- Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy
- Equivalence of Games and Markets
- Equivalence of the Core and Competitive Equilibrium in a Tiebout Economy with Crowding Types
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3138564 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3775297 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3547015 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 978457 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1082122 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1784578 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies
- Income distribution and firm formation
- Inessentiality of large groups and the approximate core property: An equivalence theorem
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Markets with a Continuum of Traders
- Monotonic Preferences and Core Equivalence
- On \(\varepsilon\)-cores of balanced games
- On \(f\)-core equivalence with general widespread externalities
- Quasi-Cores in a Monetary Economy with Nonconvex Preferences
- Stability of jurisdiction structures in economies with local public goods
- Strong Tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain
- Taste-homogeneity of optimal jurisdictions in a Tiebout economy with crowding types and endogenous educational investment choices
- The core of a continuum economy with widespread externalities and finite coalitions: From finite to continuum economies
- The epsilon core of a large replica game
- The Limit of the Core of an Economy with Production
- The nonemptiness of the \(f\)-core of a game without side payments
- Tiebout economies with differential genetic types and endogenously chosen crowding characteristics
Cited in
(20)- Anonymous price taking equilibrium in Tiebout economies with a continuum of agents: existence and characterization
- Inessentiality of large groups and the approximate core property: An equivalence theorem
- Existence of share equilibrium in symmetric local public good economies
- Monopolists of scarce information and small group effectiveness in large quasilinear economies
- Cores of many-player games; nonemptiness and equal treatment
- Convergence of the approximate cores to the aspiration core in partitioning games
- Voluntary contributions to multiple public goods in a production economy with widespread externalities
- On the core of dynamic cooperative games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1784578 (Why is no real title available?)
- Approximate Cores of Large Games
- Small informational size and interim cores of large quasilinear economies
- On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games
- Market games and clubs
- Networks and stability
- On equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players
- Superadditive market games
- Approximate cores of replica games and economies. I: Replica games, externalities, and approximate cores
- Dynamic club formation with coordination
- Small group effectiveness, per capita boundedness and nonemptiness of approximate cores
- Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes
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