Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs.

The authors introduce the parametrized collections of games with and without sidepayments and provide three nonemptiness of approximate core theorems. These results are applied to a new model of an economy with clubs. Their approach allows both widespread externalities and uniform results.

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Cites work

A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
A Reformulation of the Marginal Productivity Theory of Distribution
An Elementary Core Equivalence Theorem
An Exact Bound on Epsilon for Nonemptiness of Epsilon Cores of Games
Approximate Cores of Large Games
Approximate cores of replica games and economies. I: Replica games, externalities, and approximate cores
Bargaining, coalitions and competition
Comparative statics in matching markets
Continuity Properties of the Core of a Market
Continuum economies with finite coalitions: Core, equilibria, and widespread externalities
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Core convergence without monotone preferences and free disposal
Core equivalence with congested public goods
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Cores of partitioning games
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Epsilon cores of games with limited side payments nonemptiness and equal treatment
Equilibria, the core, and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good
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Equivalence of the Core and Competitive Equilibrium in a Tiebout Economy with Crowding Types
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1784578 (Why is no real title available?)
Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies
Income distribution and firm formation
Inessentiality of large groups and the approximate core property: An equivalence theorem
Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
Markets with a Continuum of Traders
Monotonic Preferences and Core Equivalence
On \(\varepsilon\)-cores of balanced games
On \(f\)-core equivalence with general widespread externalities
Quasi-Cores in a Monetary Economy with Nonconvex Preferences
Stability of jurisdiction structures in economies with local public goods
Strong Tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain
Taste-homogeneity of optimal jurisdictions in a Tiebout economy with crowding types and endogenous educational investment choices
The core of a continuum economy with widespread externalities and finite coalitions: From finite to continuum economies
The epsilon core of a large replica game
The Limit of the Core of an Economy with Production
The nonemptiness of the \(f\)-core of a game without side payments
Tiebout economies with differential genetic types and endogenously chosen crowding characteristics

Cited in

(20)

Anonymous price taking equilibrium in Tiebout economies with a continuum of agents: existence and characterization
Inessentiality of large groups and the approximate core property: An equivalence theorem
Existence of share equilibrium in symmetric local public good economies
Monopolists of scarce information and small group effectiveness in large quasilinear economies
Cores of many-player games; nonemptiness and equal treatment
Convergence of the approximate cores to the aspiration core in partitioning games
Voluntary contributions to multiple public goods in a production economy with widespread externalities
On the core of dynamic cooperative games
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1784578 (Why is no real title available?)
Approximate Cores of Large Games
Small informational size and interim cores of large quasilinear economies
On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games
Market games and clubs
Networks and stability
On equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players
Superadditive market games
Approximate cores of replica games and economies. I: Replica games, externalities, and approximate cores
Dynamic club formation with coordination
Small group effectiveness, per capita boundedness and nonemptiness of approximate cores
Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes

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